英语翻译人民币“入蓝”

The yuan joins the SDR
人民币“入蓝”
Maiden voyage软妹币的“第一次”
1.
PASSING through the Suez Canal became easier
earlier thisyear, thanks to an expansion completed in
August. Now it is about to become alittle bit more
complicated. Transit fees for the canal are denominated
inSpecial Drawing Rights, a basket of currencies used
by the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) as its unit of
account. This week the IMF decided toinclude the yuan
in the basket from next year, joining the dollar, the
euro,the pound and the yen.
lots of things were priced in SDRs, the IMF’s
decisionwould have forced companies around the world
to buy yuan-denominated assets assoon as possible, to
hedge their exposure. That would have prompted
China’scurrency to strengthen dramatically. But few
goods or services are priced inSDRs. Instead,
admission to the currency club is significant mainly for
itssymbolism: the IMF is lending its imprimatur to the
yuan as a reservecurrency—a safe, liquid asset in which
governments can park theirwealth. Indeed, far from

setting off a groundswell of demand for the yuan,the
IMF’s decision may pave the way for its depreciation.

reason isthat the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
will now find itself under more pressureto manage the
yuan as central banks in most rich economies do
theircurrencies—by letting market forces determine their
value. In bringing the yuaninto the SDR, the IMF had to
determine that it is “freely usable”. Beforecoming to this
decision, the IMF asked China to make changes to its
currencyregime.
importantly, China has now tied the yuan’s
exchangerate at the start of daily trading to the previous
day’s close; in the past thestarting quote was in effect
set at the whim of the PBOC, often creating a biggap
with the value at which it last traded. It was the
elimination of this gapthat lay behind the yuan’s 2%
devaluation in August, a move that rattled globalmarkets.
Though the yuan is still far from being a free-floating
currency—thecentral bank has intervened since August
to prop it up—the cost of suchintervention is now higher.
The PBOC must spend real money during the

tradingday to guide the yuan to its desired level.
ion in theSDR will only deepen the expectations
that China will let market forces decidethe yuan’s
exchange rate. The point of the SDR is to weave
disparate currenciestogether into a single, diversified
unit; some have suggested, for example,that
commodities be quoted in SDRs to reduce the volatility
of pricing them indollars. But if China maintains its de
facto peg to the dollar, the result ofadding the yuan to
the SDR will be to boost the dollar’s weight in the
basket,defeating the point.
would happen if China really did give the market
the last word on theyuan? For some time it has been
under downward pressure. The simplest yardstickis the
decline in China’s foreign- exchange reserves, from a
peak of nearly $$4trillion last year to just over $$3.5 trillion
now—a reflection, in part, of thePBOC’s selling of
dollars to support the yuan. Were it not for tighter
capitalcontrols since the summer, outflows might have
been even bigger.
the yuandoes look overvalued. Despite China’s
slowing economy, its continued link tothe surging dollar

has put it near an all- time high in trade-weighted terms,
upby more than 13% in the past 18 months (see chart).
With the Federal Reservegearing up to start raising
interest rates at the same time as China isloosening its
monetary policy, the yuan looks likely to come under
moredownward pressure, at least against the dollar.
would be foolhardy to predict that China will
suddenlygive the market free rein. That would go
against its deep-seated preference forgradual reform.
But while basking in the glow of its SDR status, China
mustalso be aware of the responsibility to minimise
intervention that comes withit. A weaker yuan may well
be the result.

1.
由于苏伊士运河已于今年八 月扩建完毕（2015年8月6日新苏伊士运河正式
开通，此处应指新运河），从今年早些时候起，渡过 运河变得容易了许多。
现在它的结构变得更为复杂了。该运河的过境费是以国际货币基金组织（IMF）
的特别提款权作为计价的——它是以一揽子货币作为其记账单位的。本周，
IMF决定从明年起 接纳人民币“入蓝”，“篮子”里已有的货币包括美元、欧元、
英镑和日元。
2.
因为许多事务都是以特别提款权作为定价的，IMF的决定迫使全球许多公司
要尽快地购买以人民币计价 的资产，以此来对冲风险。这将促使人民币大幅
升值。但是很少有商品或是服务是以特别提款权作为定价 的。相反，加入货
币俱乐部更多地具有象征意义：IMF正式批准人民币成为一种储备货币——
使其成为一种可令各国政府安心寄放的安全、流动的资产。事实上，IMF的
决定可能事与愿违，会令对 人民币的需求降温，使人民币贬值。
3.
原因是中国人民银行（PBOC）会发现自己将承 受更大的压力来管控人民币，
如同世界上大多数富裕经济体的央行管控它们的货币一样——由市场来决定
货币的价值。人民币“入蓝”，IMF必须确定它是能“自由使用”的。在做出决定
之前，IM F会要求中国政府改变其现有是汇率机制。


4.
最重要的是，中国现 行的每日汇率其开盘价是与前一交易日的收盘价相挂钩
的。而之前的开拍价事实上是由中国央行任意确定 的，往往会与最终交易价
产生较大差价。为了消除这一差价，八月时人民币贬值2%,此举曾令全球市< br>场惊愕不已。然而人民币离成为自由浮动货币为时尚早——自八月以来中国
央行开始进行干预支持 ，目前这种干预成本变得更高了。中国央行必须把钱
花在刀刃上，用以指导人民币的交易价维持在其期许 值以内。
5.
纳入特别提款权只会加深中国想让市场来决定人民币汇率的期许。特别提款< br>权将不同的货币交织成为一种单一、多元的计价单位；比如说，有人建议将
商品引入特别提款权以 减少因美元波动而影响其价格。但如果中国要是继续
紧盯美元不放，那么人民币“入蓝”将会令美元币值 暴增，一家独大，打破“篮
子”里原有的平衡。
6.
如果中国真的给了人民币踏入 市场前的临行忠告，那么将会发生什么呢？人
民币将会有一段时间的下行压力。最简单的衡量标准就是中 国的外汇储备在
下降，从去年顶峰时的4兆美元到如今的勉强3.5兆美元——这就是反应。
某 种程度上，中国央行在抛售美元来支撑人民币。若不是今夏以来更为严格
的资金管控，恐怕外流的外汇会 更多。
7.
人民币被高估了。尽管中国经济放缓，但人民币继续与飙升的美元相挂钩，使其接近了贸易加权计算的历史高位，在过去的18个月里，同比增长超过
13%（见本文图表）。 在美联储加紧启动提高利率的同时，中国放松了其货
币政策，人民币兑美元可能至少会承受更多的下行压 力。
中国会突然给市场以自由发挥的空间可能是鲁莽的预测。那将会违背中国进行渐
进式深入 改革的“心头好”。沉浸于特别提款权的荣光中，中国必须意识到对人民
币干预最小化的责任也随之而来 了。其结果可能会出现一个势弱的人民币（人民
币贬值）。