马仑芒格主义 完整版 中英对照

2020年12月18日发(作者：姬氏)
芒格主义 完整版 中英对照

(1)”Most people are too fretful, they worry too
s means being very patient, but aggressive
when it’s time.” 看完这条可不要too aggressive哈。芒格本
人曾经就因为用margin给自己带来过大 麻烦。我这个朋友
也喜欢用margin，非常危险。
1，大部分人都太浮躁、担心得太多。 成功需要非常平静耐
心，但是机会来临的时候也要足够进取。
(2)”Using [a stock’s] volatility as a measure of risk is nuts.
Risk to us is 1) the risk of permanent loss of capital, or 2)
the risk of inadequate return. Some great businesses have
very volatile returns – for example, See’s [a candy
company owned
2，根据股票的波动性来判断风险是很傻的。我们认为只有
两种风险：一，血本无 归；二，回报不足。有些很好的生意
也是波动性很大的，比如See's糖果通常一年有两个季度都是亏钱的。反倒是有些烂透了的公司生意业绩很稳定。
(3)”I think that, every time you saw the word EBITDA
[earnings], you should substitute the word “bullshit”
earnings.”
3，所谓的“息税折摊前利润”就是狗屎。
(4)“Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve
never seen him do one.”?”It’s true,” replied Buffett. “If the
value of a company doesn’t just scream out at you, it’s too
close.” 就是毛估估的意思？
4，巴菲特有时会提到“折现现金流”，但是我从来没 见过他算
这个。（巴菲特答曰“没错，如果还要算才能得出的价值那就
太不足恃了”）
(5)”If you buy something because it’s undervalued, then
you have to think about selling it when it approaches your
calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy
a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass.
That’s a good thing.” 这条大概要花很多年才能真明白 ，大
概就是未来现金流折现的意思。我觉得自己现在大概有点明
白了。
5，如果你买 了一个价值低估的股票，你就要等到价格达到
你算出来的内在价值时卖掉，这是很难算的。但是如果你买
了一个伟大的公司，你就坐那儿呆着就行了。
(6)”We bought a doomed textile mill [Berkshire Hathaway]
and a California S&L [Wesco] just before a calamity.
Both were bought at a discount to liquidation value.”
6，我们买过一个纺织厂（Berkshire Hathaway）和一个加
州的存贷行（Wesco），这俩后来都带来了灾难。但是我们
买的时候，价格都比清算价值打折还低 。
(7)”For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists,
it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots
of things increase efficiency without increasing profits. It is
way more likely to make American businesses less
profitable than more profitable. This is perfectly obvious,
but very little understood.” 我也这么认为：internet 实际上
是就业杀手，需要很多年才能消化。但是，如果能看懂这个
变化则会非常有收获。 7，互联网对于社会是极为美好的，但是对于资本家来说纯
属祸害。互联网能提高效率，但是有很多 东西都是提高效率
却降低利润的。互联网会让美国的企业少赚钱而不是多赚钱。
(8)”Virtually every investment expert’s public assessment
is that he is above average, no matter what is the evidence
to the contrary.” 这可是芒格说的哈。
8，市面上对每个投资专家的评价都是高于平均的，不管有
多少证据证明 其实根本不是那回事儿。
(9)”Investing is where you find a few great companies and
then sit on your ass.”
9，同第5条。
(10)”Warren spends 70 hours a week thinking about
investing.”
10，巴菲特每个礼拜有70个小时花在思考投资上。
(11)”People calculate too much and think too little.” 投资上
看起来确实如此。
11，人们算得太多、想得太少。
(12)”Whenever you think something or some person is
ruining your life, it’s you. A victimization mentality is so
debilitating.” < br>12，无论何时，如果你觉得有东西在摧毁你的生活，那个东
西就是你自己。老觉得自己是受害者 的想法是最削弱自己的
利器。
(13)”The tax code gives you an enormous advantage if you
can find some things you can just sit with.” 对美国人尤其
如此，外国人投美股有点不同
13，税法决定了，还是买个伟大公司傻等它飞起来最划算。
(14)”If you’re going to buy something which compounds for
30 years at 15% per annum and you pay one 35% tax at
the very end, the way that works out is that after taxes, you
keep 13.3% per annum. In contrast, if you bought the
same investment, but had to pay taxes every year of 35%
out of the 15% that you earned, then your return would be
15% minus 35% of 15%—or only 9.75% per year
compounded. So the difference there is over 3.5%. And
what 3.5% does to the numbers over long holding periods
like 30 years is truly eye-opening…” 同上句。
14，如果你买的股票每年复利回报15%，持续30年，而 你
最后一次性卖掉的时候交35%的税，那你的年回报还有
13.3%。反之，对于同一支股票 ，如果你每年都卖一次交一
次税，那你的年回报就只有9.75%。这个3.5%的差距放大
到 30年是让人大开眼界的。
(15)”The number one idea, is to view a stock as an
ownership of the business [and] to judge the staying quality
of the business in terms of its competitive advantage. Look
for more value in terms of discounted future cash flow than
you’re paying for. Move only when you have an advantage.
It’s very basic. You have to understand the odds and have
the discipline to bet only when the odds are in your favor.”
很稀饭这句。
15，最重要的，是要把股票看作对于企业 的一小片所有权，
以企业的竞争优势来判断内在的价值。要寻找未来折现的现
金利润比你支付的 股价高的机会。这是很基础的，你得明白
概率，只有当你赢的概率更大的时候才去下赌注。
(16)”Failure to handle psychological denial is a common
way for people to go broke. You’ve made an enormous
commitment to ’ve poured effort and money
in. And the more you put in, the more that the whole
consistency principle makes you think,” Now it has to work.
If I put in just a little more, then it ’all work…. People go
broke that way —because they can ’t stop,rethink,and say,’
I can afford to write this one off and live to fight again. I
don’t have to pursue this thing as an obsession —in a way
that will break me .’ “ 想起沉入成本。还想起老巴说的，如果是个坑就别再往下挖了。看看有多少人在给自己挖坑就明
白了。
16，人们破产的常见 原因是不能控制心理上的纠结。你花了
这么多心血、这么多金钱，花的越多，就越容易这么想：“估计快成了，再多花一点儿，就能成了……” 人们就是这么破
产的----因为他们不肯停下来想想 ：“之前投入的就算没了呗，
我承受得起，我还可以重新振作。我不需要为这件事情沉迷
不误， 这可能会毁了我的。”
(17)”…in terms of business mistakes that I’ve seen over a
long lifetime, I would say that trying to minimize taxes too
much is one of the great standard causes of really dumb
mistakes. I see terrible mistakes from people being overly
motivated by tax considerations. Warren and I personally
don’t drill oil wells. We pay our taxes. And we’ve done
pretty well, so far. Anytime somebody offers you a tax
shelter from here on in life, my advice would be don’t buy
it.” 让我想起那些为避税而搬离加州的有钱的朋友们，为了
省那些未来不属于自己的钱而搬到一个自己未必喜欢的地
方好像有点滑稽。当然，搬过去后又喜欢上了那 是有智慧的
表现啊，至少我还没听说哪位搬家后说新地方不好的。
17，说到我这辈子在生意 中见过的错误，过度追求避税是一
个常见的让人做傻事儿的原因。我看到有人为了避税干很大
的 错事。巴菲特和我虽然不是挖石油的，但是我们该交的税
都交，我们现在也过得挺好的。要是有人向你兜 售避税套餐，
别买。
(18)”I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great
civilization….In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some
countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the
part of the world that will do best will be Asia.” 或许50-100
年也许稍微短了一点。
18，我认为我们（美国）正处于或者接近我们文明的顶点……
如果50或者100年后，我们（美国） 只比得上亚洲某国家
的的三分之一，我一点儿也不会觉得奇怪。如果要赌，这世
界上将来干得最 棒的应该是亚洲。
(19)”To some extent, stocks are like Rembrandts. They sell
based on what they’ve sold in the past. Bonds are much
more rational. No-one thinks a bond’s value will soar to the
moon.” “Imagine if every pension fund in America bought
Rembrandts. Their value would go up and they would
create their own constituency.”
19，某些程度上，股票就像是伦勃朗的画。它们的价格基于
过去成交的价格。债券要理性得多。没有人会认为债券的价
格会高到天上去。想象一下如果美国的所有退 休基金都去买
伦勃朗的油画，它们都会升值并且引来一帮追随者。
(20)”It’s crazy to assume that what’s happening in
Argentina and Japan is inconceivable here.” 20，有人认为阿根廷和日本发生的事情在咱们这里（美国）
绝对不会发生，这种想法是很疯狂的。
(21)”REITs are way more suitable for individual
shareholders than for corporate shareholders. And Warren
has enough residue from his old cigar-butt personality that
when people became disenchanted with the REITs and the
market price went down to maybe a 20% discount from
what the companies could be liquidated for, he bought a
few shares with his personal money. So it’s nice that
Warren has a few private assets with which to pick up cigar
butts in memory of old times – if that’s what keeps him
amused.”
21，比起机构投资者，房产投资信托（REIT） 更适合个人投
资者。巴菲特还留着一些烟头性格（意指其早期偏重格雷厄
姆式的投资价值低估企 业的风格），这让他愿意在人们不喜
欢房产投资信托并且市价跌出八折以内的时候，用自己的私
房钱买点儿REIT。这种行为能让他回忆起当年捡烟头的快
乐，所以他自己有点儿闲钱鼓捣这事儿也挺 好的。
(22)”Smart people aren’t exempt from professional
disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just run
aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying
on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and
methods.”
22，聪明人也不免遭受过度自信带来的灾难 。他们认为自己
有更强的能力和更好的方法，所以往往他们就在更艰难的道
路上疲于奔命。
(23))”The whole concept of the house advantage is an
interesting one in modern money management. The terms
of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like
the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.”
23，“庄$$家优势”是个在现代理财学里很有意思的概念。那些
机构的基金经理看上去很像是赌场里 的总管，只是规模更大。
（翻译不知道准不准确，希望达人纠正）
(24)”There are always people who will be better at some
thing than you have to learn to be a follower
before you become a leader.”
24，三人行必有我师，要成为领导者之前必须先做跟随者。
(25)”We all are learning, modifying, or destroying ideas all
the time. Rapid destruction of your ideas when the time is
right is one of the most valuable qualities you can acquire.
You must force yourself to consider arguments on the
other side. If you can’t state arguments against what you
believe better than your detractors, you don’t know
enough.”
25，我们总是在学习、修正、甚至颠覆各种主意 。在恰当时
机下快速颠覆你的想法是一项很重要的品质。你要强迫自己
去考虑对立的观点。如果 你不能比你的对手更好地说服对方，
那说明你的理解还不够。
(26)“I remember the $$0.05 hamburger and a
$$0.40-per- hour minimum wage, so I’ve seen a tremendous
amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment
climate? I think not.”
26，我以前那个年代，汉堡包5美分一个、最低时薪是40
美分，所以我算是见证了巨大的通胀了。 但它摧毁了投资环
境吗？我不这么认为。
(27)”A lot of success in life and business comes from
knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad
marriage, etc.” 就是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。
27，大部分生活和事业上的成功来自于有意避免了一些东西：
早死、错误的婚姻、等等。
(28)”There are two types of mistakes: 1) doing nothing[We
saw it, but didn’t act on it]; what Warren calls “sucking my
thumb” and 2) buying with an eyedropper things we should
be buying a lot of.”
28，有两种错误：一，什么都不做（看到了机会却束之高阁），
巴菲 特说这个叫做“吮指之错”；二，本来该一堆一堆地买的
东西，我们却只买了一眼药水瓶的量。
(29)”Checklist routines avoid a lot of errors. You should
have all of this elementary wisdom, and you should go
through a mental checklist in order to use it. There is no
other procedure that will work as well.” 还是坚持不做不对
的事情的意思。
29，经常对照一下清单可以避免错误。你们应该掌握这些 基
础的智慧。对照清单之前还要过一遍心理清单（意指平常心），
这个方法是无可替代的。
(30)”Litigation is notoriously time-consuming, inefficient,
costly and unpredictable.”
30，打官司是出了名的费时、费力、低效、以及难料结果。
(31)”Finding a single investment that will return 20% per
year for 40 years tends to happen only in dreamland. In the
real world, you uncover an opportunity, and then you
compare other opportunities with that. And you only invest
in the most attractive opportunities. That’s your opportunity
cost. That’s what you learn in freshman economics. The
game hasn’t changed at all. That’s why Modern Portfolio
Theory is so asinine.” 这游戏没变过，在哪里都一样。
31，连续40年每年回报20%的投资 只存在于梦想之国。现
实世界中，你得寻找机会，然后和其他机会对比，最后只找
最吸引人的机 会投资进去。这就是你的机会成本，这是你大
一经济课上就学到的。游戏并没有发生什么变化，所以所谓
的“现代投资组合”理论非常愚蠢。
(32)”The more hard lessons you can learn vicariously
rather than through your own hard experience, the better.”
“Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it
was fortuitous.”
32，最好是从别人的悲惨经历 中学到深刻教训，而不是自己
的。我们有些成功是早就预言的，有些是意外获得的。
(33)”The general assumption is that it must be easy to sit
behind a desk and people will bring in one good
opportunity after another — this was the attitude in venture
capital until a few years ago. This was not the case at all
for us — we scrounged around for companies to buy. For
20 years, we didn’t buy more than one or two per
year. …It’s fair to say that we were rooting around. There
were no commissioned salesmen. Anytime you sit there
waiting for a deal to come by, you’re in a very dangerous
seat.” 这个有点累。
33，一般认为，最好的情形 就是你坐在办公室里，然后美好
的投资机会一个接一个地被送到你的面前 ---- 直到几年之
前，风投界的人们就是这样享受的。但是我们完全不是这样
---- 我们就跟要饭的似的到处寻找好公司来买。20年来，我
们每年最多投资一到两个公司…… 说我们已经 挖地三尺了
都不夸张。（好机会）是没有专业推销员的。如果你坐在那
里等待好机会来临，那你 的座儿很危险。
(34)”Our biggest mistakes, were things we didn’t do,
companies we didn’t buy.”
34，我们最大的错误是该做的没做、该买的没买。
(35)”You can progress only when you learn the method of
learning.”
35，你只有学会怎么学习你才会进步。
(36)”It is remarkable how much long-term advantage
people like us have gotten by trying to be consistently not
stupid, instead of trying to be very intelligent.” 小聪明和大
智慧的差别，也是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。
36，我们长期努力保持不做傻事，所以我们的收获比那些努
力做聪明事的人要多得多。
(37)”Berkshire’s past record has been almost ridiculous. If
Berkshire had used even half the leverage of, say, Rupert
Murdoch, it would be five times its current size.” 经常有很
多人用很多marg in，然后去和BRK比某年的回报，但没多
少人可以把30年的总回报拿来比的，30年以后可能还是 如
此。
37，BRK的过去业绩简直辉煌得离谱。如果我们也用杠杆，
哪怕比默多克 用的少一半，也会比现在的规模大五倍。
(38)”It took us months of buying all the Coke stock we
could to accumulate $$1 billion worth — equal to 7% of the
company. It’s very hard to accumulate major positions.”
38，买可口可乐股票的时候我们花了几个月才攒了10亿美
元的股票 --- 是可口可乐总市值的7%。要攒成主要股东是
很难的。
(39)”All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell
on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return”
39，所有的大资本最终都会发现很难扩大，于是去寻找一些
回报率更低的途径。
(40)”If you have only a little capital and are young today,
there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back
then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism
was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A
joke going around then was the guy who said, ‘I bought
stock for my old age and it worked — in six months, I feel
like an old man!’ “It’s tougher for you, but that doesn’t
mean you won’t do well — it just may take more time. But
what the heck, you may live longer.”
40，如果 今天你的资本较少并且年轻，你的机会比我们那时
候要少。我们年轻的时候刚走出大萧条，资本主义那时 候是
一个贬义词，在20年代对资本主义的批判更是肆虐。那时
候流行一个笑话：有个人说“我 买股票是为老了的时候考虑，
没想到六个月就用上了！我现在已经觉得自己是老人了。”
你们的 环境更加艰难，但并不意味着你们做不好 --- 只是要
多花些时间。但是去他娘的，你们还可能活的更长呢。
(41)”Regarding the demographic trend called Baby
Boomers, it’s peanuts compared to the trend of economic
growth.? Over the last century, [our] GNP is up seven
times.? This was not caused by Baby Boomers, but by the
general success of capitalism and the march of
technology.? Those trends were so favorable that little
blips in the birth rate were not that significant.??We can
keep social peace as long as GNP rises 3% annually – this
can pay for spending by politicians.? If we ever got to
stasis [no growth], then with all the promises, you’d get real
tensions between the generations.? The Baby Boomers
would exacerbate it, but the real cause would be lack of
growth.”
41，关于所谓“婴儿 潮（美国5、60年代出生）”的人口学现
象，其影响相对经济增长的影响来说小很多。过去的一个世< br>纪，美国的GNP（国民生产总值）增长了7倍。这不是婴
儿潮导致的，而是由美国资本主义的成 功和技术的发展带来
的。这两样东西的影响太利好，婴儿潮问题相比之下就是一
个小波动。只要 美国的GNP每年增长3%，就能保持社会和
平 --- 足以覆盖政客们的花销。如果美国的发展停滞 了，我
敢保证，你们将会见证真切的代沟，不同代的人之间关系会
很紧张。婴儿潮是这种紧张的 催化剂，但是根本原因还是经
济不增长。
(42)”Practically everybody overweighs the stuff that can be
numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques
they’re taught in academia, and doesn’t mix in the
hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is
a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no
regrets for having done that.”
42，实际上，每个人都 会把可以量化的东西看得过重，因为
他们想“发扬”自己在学校里面学的统计技巧，于是忽略了那
些虽然无法量化但是更加重要的东西。我一生都致力于避免
这种错误，我觉得我这么干挺不错的。
(43)”You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines,
and use them routinely — all of them, not just a few. Most
people are trained in one model — economics, for example
— and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the
old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like
a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems.”
43，你应该对各种学科的各种思维都有所理解，并且经常使
用它们 --- 它们的全部，而 不是某几个。大部分人都熟练于
使用某一个单一的模型，比如经济学模型，去解决所有的问
题。 应了一句老话：“拿锤子的木匠，看书上的字儿就觉着像
钉子。” 这是一种很白痴的做事方法。
(44)”The whole concept of dividing it up into ‘value’ and
‘growth’ strikes me as twaddle. It’s convenient for a bunch
of pension fund consultants to get fees prattling about and
a way for one advisor to distinguish himself from another.
But, to me, all intelligent investing is value investing.”
44，对于我而言，把股票分成“价值股”和“成长股” 就是瞎搞。
这种分法可以让基金经理们借以夸夸其谈、也可以让分析师
们给自己贴个标签，但是 在我眼中，所有靠谱的投资都是价
值投资。
(45)”In my whole life, I have known no wise people who
didn’t read all the time – none, zero. You’d be amazed at
how much Warren reads, at how much I read. My children
laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs
sticking out.”
45，我这 一辈子认识的所有智者，没有不爱看书的。我和巴
菲特看书之多都能吓着你。我的孩子取笑我说我就是一 本抻
出两条腿的书。
(46)”We read a lot.? I don’t know anyone who’s wise who
doesn’t read a lot.? But that’s not enough: You have to
have a temperament to grab ideas and do sensible things.?
Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know what
to do with them.”
46，我们都爱大量阅读，聪明人都这样，但这还不够，你还
应该有一种批判接受、合理应用的态度。 大部分人看书都没
有抓到正确的重点，看完了又不会学以致用。
(47)”We get these questions a lot from the enterprising
young. It’s a very intelligent question: You look at some old
guy who’s rich and you ask, ‘How can I become like you,
except faster?” 47，我们经常从那些上进的孩子们那儿听到这些问题。这是
个很“聪明”的问题，你对着一个有钱 老头问：“我怎么才能成
为你呢？怎么才能迅速地成为你呢？

(48)”It takes almost no capital to open a new See’s candy
store. We’re drowning in capital of our own that has almost
no cost. It would be crazy to franchise stores like some
capital-starved pancake house. We like owning our own
stores as a matter of quality control”
48，我们如果要再开一家Se e's糖果几乎不用花费任何资本。
我们的资本太多了都快淹死我们了，所以几乎是零成本。对
于有