myself是什么意思agency theory代理理论粗略翻译

2021年1月19日发(作者：billiards)
Agency theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political
science,
organizational
behavior,
and
sociology.
Yet,
it
is
still
surrounded
by
controversy.
Its
proponents
argue
that
a
revolution
is
at
hand
and
that
foundation
for
a
powerful
theory
of
organizations
is
being
put
into
place
Its
detractors
call
it
trivial,
dehumanizing,
and
even

代理理论已被学者用于在会计，经济，金融，市场营销学，政治学，组织行 为学和社会学。然而，它仍然
被争议包围。
它的支持者争辩说，
革命就在眼前，
而且
“一个强大的组织理论的基础正在落实到位”
（詹森，
1983
年，第
324
页）
。它的批评者称之为琐碎，非人性化，甚至是“危险的”
。

Which is it: grand theory or great sham? The purposes of this paper are to describe agency theory
and
to
indicate
ways
in
which
organizational
researchers
can
use
its
insights.
The
paper
is
organized
around
four
questions
that
are
germane
to
organizational
research.
The
first
asks
the
deceptively simple question, What is agency theory? Often, the technical style, mathematics, and
tautological
reasoning
of
the
agency
literature
can
obscure
the
theory.
Moreover,
the
agency
literature
is
split
into
two
camps
(Jensen,
1983),
leading
to
differences
in
interpretation.
For
example, Barney and Ouchi (1986) argued that agency theory emphasizes how capital markets can
affect the firm, whereas other authors made no reference to capital markets at all (Anderson, 1985;
Demski & Feltham, 1978; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985).
这是它：
宏大理论或大假？本文的目的是描述代理理论，
并指出如何使组织的研究人员 可以使用它的见解。
本文是围绕四个问题是有密切关系的组织研究。
第一问的看似简单的问题，
什么是代理理论？通常情况下，
技术风格，数学和文学社的同义反复的推理可以掩盖的理论。此 外，该机构的文献被分为两大阵营（詹森，
1983
）
，从而导致不同解释。例如，< br>Barney
和大内（
1986
）认为，代理理论强调怎样的资本市场能够影响 企
业，
而其他作者所有
（安德森，
1985
未提及资本市场
; Demski
＆费尔塔姆，
1978;
埃克尔斯，
1985;
艾 森哈特，

1985
）
。

The second question is, What does agency theory contribute to organizational theory? Proponents
such as Ross (1973, p. 134) argued that
such as Perrow (1986) claimed that agency theory addresses no clear problems, and Hirsch and
Friedman (1986) called it excessively narrow, focusing only on stock price. For economists, long
accustomed to treating the organization as a
may
be
revolutionary.
Yet,
for
organizational
scholars
the
worth
of
agency
theory
is
not
so
obvious.

第二个问题是，什么是代理理论有助于组织理论？支持者如罗斯 （
1973
年，第
134
页）认为，
“代理的例
子是通用的 。
”
然而，
其他学者如佩罗
（
1986
）
声称，< br>代理理论的地址不明确的问题，
赫希和
Friedman
（
1986< br>）
称之为过于狭窄，只关注股票价格。对于经济学家，早就习惯了处理组织中的企业理论的“黑盒 子”
，代理
理论可能是革命性的。然而，对于组织学者代理理论的价值就不那么明显了。

The third question is, Is agency theory empirically valid? The power of the empirical research on
agency theory to explain organizational phenomena is important to assess, particularly in light of
the criticism that agency theory is
actual
events
(Perrow,
1986,
p.
224).
Perrow
(1986)
also
criticized
the
theory
for
being
unrealistically one-sided because of its neglect of potential exploitation of workers.

第三个问题是，是代理理论实证有效的？在代理理论的实证研究来解释组织现象的力量是重要 的评估，特
别是在光的批评，
代理理论是
“很难受实证检验，
因为它很少试图 解释实际事件”
（佩罗，
1986
年，
页。

224
）
。
佩罗（
1986
）也批评理论为是因为工人的潜在剥削其忽视不切实际 的片面。

The final question is, What topics and contexts are fruitful for organizational researchers who use
agency theory? Identifying
how useful agency theory can be to organizational scholars requires
understanding the situations in which the agency perspective can provide theoretical leverage.

最后一个问题是，什么主 题和上下文是富有成效的人谁使用代理理论组织研究人员？如何识别有用的代理
理论可以是组织学者需要 了解在该机构的角度可以提供理论上的杠杆作用的情况。

The principal contributions of the paper are to present testable propositions, identify contributions
of the theory to organizational thinking, and evaluate the extant empirical literature. The overall
conclusion is that agency theory is a useful addition to organizational theory. The agency theory
ideas on risk, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and information systems are novel contributions to
organizational thinking, and the empirical evidence is supportive of the theory, particularly when
coupled with complementary theoretical perspectives.
本文的主要贡 献是提出可检验的命题，
找准理论来组织思想的贡献，
并评估现存的实证研究。
总的结 论是，
代理理论是一个有益的补充组织理论。代理理论观点上的风险，结果的不确定性，激励机制和信息 系统对
组织思维新颖的贡献，而经验证据支持的理论，加上互补的理论观点时尤为如此。

Origins of Agency Theory
代理理论的起源

During the 1960s and early 1970s, economists explored risk sharing among individuals or groups
(e.g., Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). This literature described the risk-sharing problem as one that
arises when cooperating parties have different attitudes toward risk. Agency theory broadened this
risk-sharing
literature
to
include
the
so-called
agency
problem
that
occurs
when
cooperating
parties
have
different
goals
and
division
of
labor
(Jensen
&
Meckling,
1976;
Ross,
1973).
Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party
(the principal) delegates work to an- other (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory
attempts to describe this relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

在
20
世纪
60
年代和
70年代初，经济学家探讨个人或群体之间的风险分担（例如，箭头，
1971
年威尔逊，1968
）
。
该文献中描述的风险分担问题，
因为一个出现时合作方有对 风险的不同态度。代理理论扩大了这种
风险分担的文献，
包括在合作各方有不同的目标和分工发 生了所谓的代理问题
（詹森和麦克林，
1976;
罗斯，
1973
）
。具体来说，代理理论是冲着无处不在代理关系，其中一方（委托人）委托工作的，其他（代理）
，
谁执行这项工作。代理理论试图使用合同（詹森和麦克林，
1976
）的比喻来形 容这种关系。

Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships.
The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent
conflict
and
(b)
it
is
difficult
or
expensive
for
the principal
to
verify
what
the
agent
is
actually
doing.
The
problem
here
is
that
the
principal
cannot
verify
that
the
agent
has
behaved
appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent
have
different
attitudes
toward
risk.
The
problem
here
is
that
the
principal
and
the
agent
may
prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.

代理理论关注与解决，可以发 生在代理关系的两个问题。首先是机构问题出现时，
（一）委托人和代理人的
冲突及（
b
）就很难或昂贵的主体来验证一下代理实际上是这样做的愿望或目标。这里的问题是，委托人不
能确认代理已经表现得恰如其分。二是风险分担的出现时，委托人和代理人都对风险的不同态度的问题。
这里的问题是，委托人和受托人可能更喜欢，因为不同风险偏好的不同的动作。

Because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the principal and
the
agent,
the
focus
of
the
theory
is
on
determining
the
most
efficient
contract
governing
the
principal-agent
relationship
given
assumptions
about
people
(e.g.,
self-interest,
bounded
rationality,
risk
aversion),
organizations
(e.g.,
goal
conflict
among
members),
and
information
(e.g., information is a commodity which can be purchased). Specifically, the question becomes, Is
a
behavior- oriented
contract
(e.g.,
salaries,
hierarchical
governance)
more
efficient
than
an
outcome-oriented
contract
(e.g.,
commissions,
stock
options,
transfer
of
property
rights,
market
governance)? An overview of agency theory is given in Table 1.

因为分析的单位是管理委托人和代理人之间的关系的合同，该理论的重点是确定监管提供了有 关人士（如
自身利益，有限理性假设的委托

-
代理关系的最有效的合同， 风险厌恶）
，组织（成员之间如目标冲突）
，
信息（例如，信息是一种商品，可以购买 ）
。具体来说，问题就变成，是一个行为导向的合同（例如，工资，
分层治理）比以成果为导向 的合同更有效率（如佣金，股票期权，产权转让，市场治理）？代理理论的概
述示于表
1
。

The agency structure is applicable in a variety of settings, ranging from macrolevel issues such as
regulatory policy to microlevel dyad phenomena such as blame, impression management, lying,
and
other
expressions
of
self-interest.
Most
frequently,
agency
theory
has
been
applied
to
organizational phenomena such as compensation (e.g., Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1985),
acquisition
and
diversification
strategies
(e.g.,
Amihud
&
Lev,
1981),
board
relationships
(e.g.,
Fama
&
Jensen,
1983;
Kosnik,
1987),
ownership
and
financing
structures
(e.g.,
Argawal
&
Mandelker, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), vertical integration (Ander- son, 1985; Eccles, 1985),
and
innovation
(Bolton,
1988;
Zenger,
1988).
Overall,
the
domain
of
agency
theory
is
relationships that mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in
cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk.
该机构结构适用于各 种环境，从宏观层面的问题，如监管政策，微观对子现象，如怪，印象管理，卧，和
自身利益的其他表情 。最常见的，代理理论已被应用到组织现象，如补偿（例如，康伦和公园，
1988;
艾森哈特，
1985
）
，
收购和多元化战略
（例如，
Ami hud
＆列弗，
1981
）
，
董事会的关系
（例如，
法玛和詹森，
1983;
Kosnik
，
1987
）
， 所有权和融资结构（例如，
Argawal
＆
Mandelker
，
1987;
詹森和麦克林，
1976
）
，垂直整合
（安德儿子，1985;
埃克尔斯，
1985
）
，创新（博尔顿，
1988;
曾格，
1988
）
。总体而言，代理理论的域名是反
映一个主体和一 个代理谁从事合作行为的基本机构的结构，但具有不同的目标和对风险的不同态度的关系

Agency Theory

From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two lines: positivist
and principal- agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a common unit of analysis: the contract
between
the
principal
and
the
agent.
They
also
share
common
assumptions
about
people,
organizations,
and
information.
However,
they
differ
in
their
mathematical
rigor,
dependent
variable, and style.

从它在信息经济学根源，代理理论是 沿着两条线发展。实证主义和委托代理（詹森，
1983
）两个流共享分
析的常用单位 ：委托人和代理人之间的合同。他们还共享关于个人，组织和信息共同假设。然而，他们在
数学的严谨性 ，因变量和样式不同。

Positivist Agency Theory

Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the principal and agent are
likely
to
have
conflicting
goals
and
then
describing
the
governance
mechanisms
that
limit
the
agent's
self-serving
behavior.
Positivist
re-
search
is
less
mathematical
than
principal-agent
research. Also, positivist researchers have focused almost exclusively on the special case of the
principal-agent relationship between owners and managers of large, public corporations (Berle &
Means, 1932).

实证研究都集中在识别在哪些情 况下委托人和代理人可能有相互冲突的目标，然后描述，限制了代理人的
利己行为的治理机制。实证重新 搜索比委托代理研究较少的数学。此外，实证研究人员已经几乎全部集中
在大型，公共机构（伯利和米恩 斯，
1932
）的所有者和经营者之间的委托代理关系的特殊情况。

Three
articles
have
been
particularly
influential.
Jensen
and
Meckling
(1976)
explored
the
ownership
structure
of
the
corporation,
including
how
equity
ownership
by
managers
aligns
managers' interests with those of owners. Fama (1980) discussed the role of efficient capital and
labor markets as information mechanisms that are used to control the self-serving behavior of top
executives. Fama and Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors as an information
system that the stockholders within large corporations could use to monitor the op- portunism of
top
executives.
Jensen
and
his
col-
leagues
(Jensen,
1984;
Jensen
&
Roeback,
1983)
extended
these ideas to controversial practices, such as golden parachutes and corporate raiding.

三篇文章都特别 有影响力。詹森和麦克林（
1976
）探讨了公司的所有权结构，包括如何拥有股权由经理对< br>齐管理者与所有者的利益。法玛（
1980
）讨论了作为用于控制的高层管理人员的利己 行为的信息机制，有
效的资本和劳动力市场的作用。法玛和詹森（
1983
）描述为大 型企业内部的股东可以用它来监测运算
portunism
的高管信息系统董事会的作用。
Jensen
和他的同事联赛（詹森，
1984;
詹森和
Ro eback
，
1983
）
扩展了这些想法有争议的做法，如金色降落伞和企业 扫荡。

From a theoretical perspective, the positivist stream has been most concerned with describing the
governance
mechanisms
that
solve
the
agency
problem.
Jensen
(1983,
p.
326)
described
this
interest
as

certain
contractual
relations
arise.
Two
propositions
capture
the
governance
mechanisms which are identified in the positivist stream. One proposition is that outcome-based
contracts are effective in curbing agent opportunism. The argument is that such contracts coalign
the preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the
same
actions,
and,
there-
fore,
the
conflicts
of
self- interest
between
principal
and
agent
are
reduced. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described how increasing the firm ownership
of the managers decreases managerial opportunism. In formal terms,

从理论的角度，实证流一直最关心的描述是解决代理问题的治理机制。詹森（
1983
年，第< br>326
页）这说明
利益，
“为什么某些合同关系产生的。
”两个命题捕 捉它们在实证数据流中确定的治理机制。一个命题是基
于成果的合同是有效遏制代理人的机会主义。的说 法是，这种合同
coalign
与这些主要代理的喜好，因为无
论是奖励依赖于相同的 动作，并有上脱颖而出，委托人与代理人之间的自我利益的冲突就会减少。例如，
詹森和麦克林（
1976
）介绍了如何提高管理者的企业所有权降低管理机会主义。在正式条款

Proposition 1: When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is
more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.

命题
1
：当委托人与代理人之间的合同是一个基于 成果，代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。

The second proposition is that information systems also curb agent opportunism. The argument
here is that, since information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing,
they
are
likely
to
curb
agent
opportunism
because
the
agent
will
realize
that
he
or
she
cannot
deceive
the
principal.
For
example,
Fama
(1980)
described
the
information
effects
of
efficient
capital and labor markets on managerial opportunism, and Fama and Jensen (1983) described the
information role that boards of directors play in controlling managerial behavior. In formal terms,

第二个 命题是，信息系统也遏制代理人的机会主义。这里的论点是，由于信息系统的通知校长关于什么的
代理实 际上是干什么的，他们很可能会遏制代理人机会主义因为代理会意识到他或她不能欺骗主事人。例
如，法 玛（
1980
）
描述了管理上的机会主义有效的资本市场和劳动力市场信息的影响，法 玛
和詹森（
1983
）描述的信息的作用是董事局的控制管理行为发挥。在正式条款，

Proposition
2:
When
the
principal
has
information
to
verify
agent
behavior,
the
agent
is
more
likely to behave in the interests of the principal.

命题
2
：当主要有信息来验证代理行为，代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。

At its best, positivist agency theory can be regarded as enriching economics by offering a more
complex view of organizations (Jensen, 1983). However, it has been criticized by organizational
theorists
as
minimalist
(Hirsch,
Michaels,
&
Friedman,
1987;
Perrow,
1986)
and
by
microeconomists as tautological and lacking rigor (Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, positivist agency
theory
has
ignited
considerable
research
(Barney
&
Ouchi,
1986)
and
popular
interest
(
Mike,

在其最好的，实证代理理论可以 看作是通过提供组织（詹森，
1983
）更复杂的视图富民经济。然而，它已
被批评组 织理论家简约（赫希，迈克尔，与弗里德曼，
1987;
佩罗，
1986
）和 微观经济学家的同义反复，缺
乏严谨性（詹森，
1983
）
。然而，实证代理 理论闹得沸沸扬扬相当重新搜索（巴尼和藕池，
1986
）和流行的
权益（
“ 相约迈克，
”
1988
）

Principal-Agent Research
委托代理研究

Principal-agent researchers are concerned with a general theory of the principal-agent relationship,
a
theory
that
can
be
applied
to
employer-employee,
lawyer-client,
buyer-supplier,
and
other
agency relationships (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Characteristic of formal theory, the principal- agent
paradigm involves careful specification of assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction
and mathematical proof.

委托代理的研究人员所关心的的委托

-
代理关系的一般理论，可以应用于 雇主与雇员，律师与委托人，买
方与供应商理论，和其他机构的关系（哈里斯和拉维夫，
197 8
）
。形式理论的特征，委托代理模式包括仔细
规范的假设，这之后是逻辑推理和数学 证明

In comparison with the positivist stream, principal-agent theory is abstract and mathematical and,
therefore, less accessible to organizational scholars. Indeed, the most
vocal critics
of the theory
(Perrow, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1987) have focused their attacks primarily on the more widely known
positivist
stream.
Also,
the
principal-agent
stream
has
a
broader
focus
and
greater
interest
in
general, theoretical implications. In contrast, the positivist writers have focused almost exclusively
on the special case of the owner/CEO relationship in the large corporation. Finally, principal-agent
research includes many more testable implications.

与实证流相比，委托代理理论是抽象的，数学的，因此，较少接触到组织的学者。事实上，这个理论的最
强烈批评（佩罗，
1986;
。
Hirsch
等，
1987
）主要集中于更广为人知的实证流他们的攻击。此外，委托代理
流具有更广泛的关注，并在一般情况下 ，理论意义更大的兴趣。与此相反，实证作家们几乎全部集中在大
公司的老板
/ CEO
关系的特殊情况。最后，委托代理研究包括更多的可测试性的影响。

For organizational scholars, these differences provide background for understanding criticism of
the theory. However, they are not crucial. Rather, the important point is that the two streams are
complementary:
Positivist
theory
identifies
various
contract
alternatives,
and
principal-agent
theory indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of out-come uncertainty,
risk aversion, information, and other variables described below.
对于组织的学者，这些差异对 理解理论的批判提供了背景。然而，它们并不重要。相反，重要的一点是，
这两个数据流是互补的：实证 理论确定各种合同的替代品，并委托

-
代理理论表明该合同是最有效的在不
同的门诊来的不确定性，风险厌恶情绪，信息和描述的其他因素的水平下文。

The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus
outcome, between the principal and the agent. The simple model assumes goal conflict between
principal and agent, an easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk averse than the
principal. (Note: The argument behind a more risk averse agent is that agents, who are unable to
diversify their employment, should be risk averse and principals, who are capable of diversifying
their investments, should be risk neutral.) The approach of the simple model can be described in
terms
of
cases
(e.g.,
Demski
&
Feltham,
1978).
The
first
case,
a
simple
case
of
complete
information,
is
when
the
principal
knows
what
the
agent
has
done.
Given
that
the
principal
is
buying
the
agent's
behavior,
then
a
contract
that
is
based
on
be-
havior
is
most
efficient.
An
outcome-based contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent, who is assumed to be more
risk averse than the principal.

委托代理文学的重点是确定最优契约，行为与结果，委托人和代理人之间。简单的模型假定委托人和代理
人，一个容易测量结果，并代理谁更厌恶风险比委托人之间的目标冲突。

（注：后面更多的风 险规避者的
论点是，代理人，谁不能分散他们的就业，应该是风险规避和校长，谁能够分散他们的投资， 应该是风险
中性的）的简单模型的方法可以的情况下（例如，
Demski
＆费尔塔姆 ，
1978
）来描述。第一种情况下，完
整的信息，一个简单的例子，就是当校长知道 代理人已经完成。鉴于主要是购买代理的行为，则是基于行
为的一个合同是最有效的。以结果为基础的合 同将不必要的风险转移给代理，谁被认为是更厌恶风险比本
金。

The second case is when the principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Given the
self-interest of the agent, the agent may or may not have behaved as agreed. The agency problem
arises
because
(a)
the
principal
and
the
agent
have
different
goals
and
(b)
the
principal
cannot
determine
if
the
agent
has
behaved
appropriately.
In
the
formal
literature,
two
aspects
of
the
agency
problem
are
cited.
Moral
hazard
refers
to
lack
of
effort
on
the
part
of
the
agent.
The
argument here is that the agent may simply not put forth the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent
is
shirking.
For
example,
moral
hazard
occurs
when
a
research
scientist
works
on
a
personal
research
project
on
company
time,
but
the
research
is
so
complex
that
corporate
management
cannot detect what the scientist is actually doing. Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation
of
ability
by
the
agent.
The
argument
here
is
that
the
agent
may
claim
to
have
certain
skills
or
abilities when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely
verify
these
skills
or
abilities
either
at
the
time
of
hiring
or
while
the
agent
is
working.
For
example,
adverse
selection
occurs
when
a
research
scientist
claims
to
have
experience
in
a
scientific specialty and the employer cannot judge whether this is the case.

第二 种情况是当校长不知道到底是什么代理做了。由于代理的自身利益，代理人可能会或可能不会表现为
一致 。代理问题的产生是因为（一）委托人和代理人具有不同的目标和（二）委托人不能确定是否代理已
表现 得恰如其分。在正式文献，代理问题的两个方面的引用。道德风险是指缺乏对代理的部分努力。这里
的论 点是，代理可能根本就没有提出商定的努力。也就是说，代理人是在推卸。例如，发生道德风险，当
一个 科学家工作在公司的时间是个人研究项目，
但研究是如此复杂，
企业管理无法检测哪些科学家正 在做。
逆向选择是指由代理能力的失实陈述。这里的论点是，代理人可以要求有一定的技能或能力时，他 或她被
雇佣。
逆向选择的产生是由于委托人不能完全证实这些技能或能力无论是在招聘时或代理 人工作时。
例如，
逆向选择当一名研究科学家声称在科学的专业和用人单位的经验无法判断这是 否是这种情况发生。

In the case of unobservable behavior (due to moral hazard or adverse selection), the principal has
two options. One is to discover the agent's behavior by investing in information systems such as
budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, and additional layers of management.
Such
investments
reveal
the
agent's
behavior
to
the
principal,
and
the
situation
reverts
to
the
complete information case. In formal terms,

Proposition
3:
Information
systems
are
positively
related
to
behavior-based
contracts
and
negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

在无法观察的行为（由于道德风险和逆向选择）的情况下，主要有两种选择。一是通过投资， 如预算编制
制度，报告程序，董事会，管理层和其他层面的信息系统来发现代理的行为。这样的投资显示 了代理的行
为本金，情况恢复到完整的信息的情况下。在正式条款，

命题
3
：信息系统是正相关的行为为基础的合同，并以成果为基础的合同负相关。

The other option is to contract on the outcomes of the agent's behavior. Such an outcome-based
contract motivates behavior by coalignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal,
but at the price of transferring risk to the agent. The issue of risk arises because outcomes are only
partly
a
function
of
behaviors.
Government
policies,
economic
climate,
competitor
actions,
technological change, and so on, may cause uncontrollable variations in outcomes. The resulting
outcome uncertainty introduces not only the inability to preplan, but also risk that must be borne
by someone. When outcome uncertainty is low, the costs of shifting risk to the agent are low and
outcome-based contracts are attractive. However, as uncertainty increases, it becomes increasingly
expensive
to
shift
risk
despite
the
motivational
benefits
of
outcome-based
contracts.
In
formal
terms,

Proposition
4:
Outcome
uncertainty
is
positively
related
to
behavior-based
contracts
and
negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

另一种选择是合同上的代理行为的结果。这样的结果，基于合同行为的动机被代理人的喜好与 那些主要的
coalignment
，但在把风险转移给代理的价格。风险的问题的产生是因 为结果是只有部分的行为的函数。政
府的政策，经济环境，竞争对手的行动，技术变革，等等，可能会导 致结果的不可控的变化。由此产生的
结果的不确定性引入不仅无法预案，但风险也必须由人来承担。当结 果的不确定性低，转移风险的代理成
本低，成果为基础的合同是有吸引力的。然而，由于不确定性的增加 ，它变得越来越昂贵，尽管成果为基
础的合同的激励效益转移风险。在正式条款，

命题
4
：结果不确定度是正相关，基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关

This simple agency model has been described in varying ways by many authors (e.g., Demski &
Feltham, 1978; Harris & Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979). However, the heart of
principal-agent theory is the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring behavior and (b) the cost
of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent.

这个简单的代理模式已经以不同的方式被描述的许多学者（例如，

Demski
＆费尔塔姆，

1978
哈里斯和
拉维夫，
1979;
霍姆斯特罗姆，
1979;
沙维尔，

1979
）

。然而，委托

-
代理理论的心脏是衡量行为（一）
成本和测量结 果，并把风险转移给代理（二）成本之间的权衡。

A
number
of
extensions
to
this
simple
model
are
possible.
One
is
to
relax
the
assumption
of
a
risk-averse
agent
(e.g.,
Harris
&
Raviv,
1979).
Research
(MacCrimmon
&
Wehrung,
1986)
indicates
that
individuals
vary
widely
in
their
risk
attitudes.
As
the
agent
becomes
increasingly
less risk averse (e.g., a wealthy agent), it becomes more attractive to pass risk to the agent using an
outcome-based
contract.
Conversely,
as
the
agent
becomes
more
risk
averse,
it
is
increasingly
expensive to pass risk to the agent. In formal terms,

Proposition 5: The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to behavior-based contracts and
negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

许多扩展到这个简单的模型是可能的。一是放宽规避风险的代理人（例如，哈里斯和拉维夫，

1979
）的假
设。研究（

MacCrimmon
＆

Wehrung
，

1986
）表明，个体 差异很大风险的态度。为展开剂变得越来越
少风险规避（例如，一个富裕剂）

，它变 得更具吸引力使用基于结果的合同风险传递给代理。相反，随着
代理变得更厌恶风险，这是越来越昂贵传 递风险的代理权。在正式条款，

命题
5
：代理的风险厌恶情绪正相关，基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关。

Similarly, as the principal becomes more risk averse, it is increasingly attractive to pass risk to

the agent. In formal terms,

Proposition 6: The risk aversion of the principal is negatively related to behavior-based contracts
and positively related to outcome- based contracts.

同样，作为主要变得更加厌恶风险，这是越来越有吸引力的传递风险

该代理。在正式条款，

命题
6
：主要的避险情绪负相关行为为基础的合同，并正相关成果为基础的合同。

Another extension is to relax the assumption of goal conflict between the principal and agent (e.g.,
Demski, 1980). This might occur either in a highly socialized or clan-oriented firm (Ouchi, 1979)
or in situations in which self- interest gives way to selfless behavior (Perrow, 1986). If there is no
goal conflict, the agent will behave as the principal would like, regardless of whether his or her
behavior is monitored. As goal conflict decreases, there is a decreasing motivational imperative
for
outcome-based
contracting,
and
the
issue
reduces
to
risk-sharing
considerations.
Under
the
assumption
of
a
risk-averse
agent,
behavior-based
contracts
become
more
attractive.
In
formal
terms,

Proposition
7:
The
goal
conflict
between
principal
and
agent
is
negatively
related
to
behavior-
based contracts and positively related to out- come-based contracts.

另一个扩展是放松的委托人和代理人（如< br>Demski
，
1980
）之间的目标冲突的假设。这可能发生在任何一个高度社会或氏族为导向的公司（大内，
1979
）或在哪些情况下的自我利益让位给无私行 为（佩罗，
1986
）
。
如果不存在目标冲突，则代理将表现为主要想，不管 他或她的行为是否受到监督。由于目标冲突减少，有
降低激励当务之急成果为基础的合同，并且问题减少 了风险分担的考虑。下一个规避风险代理的假设下，
基于行为的合同变得更具吸引力。在正式条款，

命题
7
：委托人与代理人之间的目标冲突负相关行为为基础的合同， 并正相关外前来为基础的合同。

Another set of extensions relates to the task performed by the agent. For example, the progammability of the task
is likely to influence the ease of measuring behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988). Programmability is defined as the
degree to which appropriate behavior by the agent can be specified in advance. For example, the job of a retail
sales
cashier
is
much
more
programmed
than
that
of
a
high-technology
entrepreneur.
The
argument
is
that
the
behavior
of
agents
engaged
in
more
programmed
jobs
is
easier
to
observe
and
evaluate.
Therefore,
the
more
programmed
the
task,
the
more
attractive
are
behavior-based
contracts
because
information
about
the
agent's
behavior
is
more
readily
determined.
Very
programmed
tasks
readily
reveal
agent
behavior,
and
the
situation
reverts to the complete information case. Thus, retail sales clerks are
more likely to be paid via behavior-based
contracting
(e.g.,
hourly
wages),
whereas
entrepreneurs are
more
likely
to
be
compensated
with
outcome-based
contracts (e.g., stock ownership). In formal terms,

Proposition
8:
Task
programmability
is
positively
related
to
behavior-based
contracts
and
negatively
related
to
outcome-based contracts.

另一组扩展 涉及到由代理执行的任务。例如，任务的
progammability
可能影响易于测量的行 为（艾森哈特，

1985
年，

1988
年）

。可编程定义为它的代理人适当的行为可以事先指定的程度。例如，零售销售点收银
员的工作比 一个高科技企业家更编程。的说法是代理商的行为从事更多的编程工作更容易观察和评价。因
此，更多的 编程任务，更吸引人的是基于行为的合同，因为对代理人的行为的信息更容易确定。非常程式
化的任务正 揭示代理行为，情况恢复到完整的信息的情况下。因此，零售销售业务员更容易通过基于行为
的合同（例 如，每小时工资）支付，而企业家更可能与基于结果的合同（如股权）进行补偿。在正式条款，

8
号提案：任务的可编程性是正相关的基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关。

Another task characteristic is the measurability of the outcome (Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985). The simple
model assumes that outcomes are easily measured. However, some tasks require a long time to complete, involve
joint or team effort, or produce soft outcomes. In these

circumstances, outcomes are either difficult to measure or difficult to measure within a practical amount of time.
When
outcomes
are
measured
with
difficulty,
outcome-based
contracts
are
less
attractive.
In
contrast,
when
outcomes are readily measured, outcome-based contracts are more attractive. In formal terms,

Proposition
9:
Outcome
measurability
is negatively
related
to behavior-based
contracts
and positively
related
to
outcome-based contracts.

另一项任务 的特点是结局
（安德森，
1985;
艾森哈特，
1985
）
的可测性。
简单的模型假设的结果是容易衡量。
然而，有些任务需要很长的时间才能完成，涉及 关节或团队的努力，或产生软的结果。在这些情况下，结
果是要么难以衡量或难以在规定时间内的实际金 额来衡量。当结果是衡量困难，以成果为基础的合同是不
具备吸引力。相反，当结果很容易测量，以成果 为基础的合同更有吸引力。在正式条款，

命题
9
：结果可测性是负相关的行 为为基础的合同，并正相关成果为基础的合同。

Finally, it seems reasonable that when principals and agents engage in a long-term relationship, it is likely that the
principal
will
learn
about
the
agent
(e.g.,
Lambert,
1983)
and
so
will
be
able
to
assess
behavior
more
readily.
Conversely, in short-term agency relationships, the information asymmetry between principal and agent is likely to
be greater, thus making outcome-based contracts more attractive. In formal terms,

Proposition
10:
The
length
of
the
agency
relationship
is
positively
related
to
behavior-based
contracts
and
negatively related to outcome- based contracts.

最后，
它似乎是合理的，
当委托人与代理人搞了长期合作关系，
很可能主要将了解剂
（例如，
兰伯特，
1983
）
，
因此将能更准确地评估行为。相反，在短期代理关系，委托人和 代理人之间的信息不对称很可能是更大，
从而使以成果为基础的合同更有吸引力。在正式条款，

命题
10
：委托代理关系的长度正相关行为为基础的合同，并以成果为基础的合同负相 关。

Agency Theory and the Organizational Literature
代理理论和组织文学


Despite Perrow's (1986) assertion that agency theory is very different from organization theory, agency theory has
several links to mainstream organization perspectives (see Table 2). At its roots, agency theory is consistent with
the classic works of Barnard (1938) on the nature of co- operative behavior and March and Simon (1958) on the
inducements and contributions of the employment relationship. As in this earlier work, the heart of agency theory
is
the
goal
conflict
inherent
when
individuals
with
differing
preferences
engage
in
cooperative
effort,
and
the
essential metaphor is that of the contract.

尽管佩罗（
1986
）断言，代理理论是从组织理论有很大不同，代理理论 有几个链接，主流机构的观点（见
表
2
）
。在它的根，代理理论与巴纳德（< br>1938
）对合作行为的性质上的雇佣关系的利诱和贡献的经典作品和
March
和
Simon
（
1958
）是一致的。在这个早期的工作，代理理论的心脏 是目标冲突时，固有具有不同的
偏好个人从事合作努力，以及必要的比喻是，该合同的。

Agency theory is also similar to political models of organizations. Both agency and political perspectives assume
the pursuit of self- interest at the individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (e.g., March, 1962;
Pfeffer, 1981). Also, in both perspectives, information asymmetry is linked to the power of lower order participants
(e.g., Pettigrew, 1973). The difference is that in political models goal conflicts are resolved through bargaining,
negotiation, and coalitions-the power mechanism of political science. In agency theory they are resolved through
the coalignment of incentives-the price mechanism of economics.

代理理论也是类似的组织政治模式。这两个机构的政治观点在假设在组织层面个人层面和目标冲突，追求
自我利益（例如，三月，

1962
;
普费弗，

1981
）

。此外，在这两个角度来看，信息不对称是与较低阶的
参与者（例如，佩蒂格鲁，
1973
）的功率。所不同的是，在政治模式的目标冲突通过谈判， 协商和政治学
的联盟，动力机制解决。在代理理论，他们是通过激励机制的最经济的价格机制的
coalignment
解决。

Agency
theory
also
is
similar
to
the
information
processing
approaches
to
contingency
theory
(Chandler, 1962;
Galbraith,
1973;
Lawrence
&
Lorsch,
1967).
Both
perspectives
are
information
theories.
They
assume
that
individuals are boundedly rational and that information is distributed asymmetrically throughout the organization.
They also are efficiency theories; that is, they use efficient processing of information as a criterion for choosing
among various organizing forms (Galbraith, 1973). The difference between the two is their focus: In contingency
theory
researchers
are
concerned
with
the
optimal
structuring
of
reporting
relationships
and
decision-making
responsibilities (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), whereas in agency theory they are concerned
with the optimal structuring of control relationships resulting from these reporting and decision-making patterns.
For example, using contingency theory, we would be concerned with whether a firm is organized in a divisional or
matrix agency theory, we would be concerned with whether managers within the chosen structure