kitty是什么意思A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking(部分翻译)

2021年1月19日发(作者：kougou)
A BEHA
VIORAL AGENCY MODEL OF MANAGERIAL RISK TAKING
管理风险承担的行为代理模型

Building
on
agency
and
prospect
theory
views,
we
construct,
in
this
article,
a
behav-ioral agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements
of
internal
corporate
governance
with
problem
framing
to
explain
executive
risk-taking behavior. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and
within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk-seeking as well
as risk-averse behaviors. We develop
specific propositions that combine monitoring
with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices
of
strategic
risk.
The
resulting
propositions
enhance
and
extend
the
agency-based
cor-porate governance literature on executive risk taking.


theory
...
[is
characterized]
by
its
em-phasis
on
the
risk
attitudes
of
principals
and
agents
(Barney
&
Hesterly,
1996:
124).
Specifi- cally,
principals
are
considered risk neutral in their preferences for individual firm actions, since they can
diversify
their
shareholdings
across
multiple
firms.
Conversely,
since
agent
employment
security
and
income
are
inextrica-bly
tied
to
one
firm,
agents
are
assumed to ex- hibit risk aversion in decisions regarding the firm in order to lower risk
to
personal
wealth
(Donaldson,
1961;
Williamson,
1963).
However,
agent
risk
aversion
creates
opportunity
costs
for
risk-neutral
principals
who
prefer
that
agents
maximize
firm
returns
(Baysinger,
Kosnik,
&
Turk,
1991;
Garen,
1994;
Hill
&
Hansen, 1989; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1988; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1992; Morck,
Schleifer,
&
Vishny,
1988).
This

differential
(Beatty
&
Zajac,
1994;
Coffee,
1988)
between
agents
and
principals
creates
a

hazard
problem
in
the
principal-agent
relation-ship.
The
challenge
of
corporate
governance
is
to
set
up
supervisory
and
incentive
alignment
mechanisms
that
alter
the
risk
orientation
of
agents
to
align
them
with
the
interests
of
prin-cipals
(Tosi
&
Gomez-Mejia,
1989).
Despite
the
fundamental
role
risk
plays
in
the
calculus
of
agency
theory,
it
is
our
contention that agency theory's formulation of risk has been too restrictive and naive.
This narrow view of risk has prevented a fuller understanding of managerial decision
making
under
conditions
of
dissimilar
risk
bearing
and
risk
preferences
between
agents and principals. In this article we attempt to enhance agency theory's treatment
of risk by addressing these limitations.

We can challenge agency-based views of risk on several counts. First, risk remains an
under-developed
concept
within
agency
theory.
In
gen-eral,
agency-based
corporate
governance
mod-els
restrict
risk-taking
behavior
of
agents
either
to
risk
aversion
(preferring lower risk options at the expense of returns) or neutrality (seeking options
where risk is compensated), thus tend-ing to neglect the possibility of risk-seeking (cf.,
Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; Machina, 1983; Markowitz, 1952;
Piron & Smith,
1995;
Wiseman
&
Bromiley,
1996)
or
risk-
behavior
(accept-ing
options
where risk is not fully compensated; e.g., Asch & Quandt, 1990; Bulmash & Maherz,
1985;
Coffee,
1988;
Piron
&
Smith,
1995).
In
gen-eral,
agency
scholars
consider
non-risk-averse
preferences
outside
those
induced
by
the
com-pensation
contract
as
either special cases (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 338-340) or
1971)
and,
therefore,
generally
ignore
them
altogether.
In
contrast,
a
large
body
of
knowledge
on
risk-taking
behavior
(Bowman,
1980;
Bromiley,
1991;
Fiegenbaum,
1990; Jegers, 1991; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987; Sinha,
1994;
Tversky
&
Kahneman,
1981)
has
grown
independently
from
the
agency
literature, challenging the restrictive risk assumptions often included in agency-based
mod-els.
By
incorporating
this
literature
into
agency-based
models
of
corporate
governance,
we
can
relax
these
assumptions
and
possibly
improve
the
explanatory
power of agency models of cor- porate governance.

Second,
both
normative
and
positivist
agency
scholars
typically
assume
stable
risk
prefer-ences (often characterized as a second-order utility curve; e.g., Lambert, 1986;
Shavell, 1979) in models explaining changes in organization wealth (e.g., Holmstrom,
1979).
This
premise
con-tradicts
behavioral
decision
theory
(Bazerman,
1994;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March & Shapira, 1992) and research (Bromiley, 1991;
Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Lant, 1992; Wiseman
& Catanach, 1997) and ultimately limits agency theory's con-tribution to explaining
how
managerial
risk
tak-ing
affects
firm
performance.
In
this
article
we
relax
the
assumption
that
agents
hold
consis-tent
risk
preferences
(e.g.,
increasing
or
decreas-ing
risk
aversion)
and
utilize
a
contingency-based
view
from
behavioral
research on risk taking to allow for the possibility of varied risk preferences by the
agent in a corporate gover- nance context.

Third,
despite
considerable
theoretical
(e.g.,
Baysinger
&
Hoskisson,
1990;
Coffee,
1988),
ana-lytical
(e.g.,
Holmstrom,
1979;
Shavell,
1979),
and
empirical
(e.g.,
Hoskisson et al., 1992) support for a link between governance structure and agent risk
choices,
the
precise
relationship
remains
in
question.
This
suggests
that
models
relying on governance structure alone may be inadequate and that additional factors
may influence man-agerial risk taking. For example, scholars exam-ining managerial
risk taking have found that governance factors alone provide insufficient explanations
of
managerial
risk
preferences
(Catanach
&
Brody,
1993;
Golbe
&
Shull,
1991).
Further, some preliminary evidence suggests that aspects of the decision situation, as
cap-tured
in

framing
and
as
suggested
by
prospect
theory
(Kahneman
&
Tversky, 1979), add to corporate governance models of manage-rial choice behavior
(Palmer, 1995; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). We propose here a more com-prehensive
view of managerial
risk taking, for-mally integrating both
the risk and performance
attributes
of
the
choice
situation
as
well
as
the
internal
governance
structure
into
a
synthetic view of managerial risk.

Finally, despite a growing body of research on multiperiod contracts (Elitzur & Yaari,
1995;
Holmstrom
&
Milgrom,
1987;
Lambert,
1983),
scholars'
treatments
of
agent
risk
and
perfor-mance
in
the
corporate
governance
literature
often
are
linear
and
recursive.
That
is,
their
models
of
agent
behavior
tend
to
predict
perfor-mance
outcomes based on the agent's risk pref-erences (McGuire, 1988; Rees, 1985), current
wealth
(Elitzur
&
Yaari,
1995),
and
the
risk
and
performance
characteristics
of
available
op- tions
(Hoskisson
et
al.,
1992;
Kerr
&
Kren,
1992).1
Evidence
from
outside
of
the
agency
stream,
however,
demonstrates
a
more
complex
relation
between performance and executive choices of risk (cf., Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).
For exam-ple, an executive's current wealth may provide only a point of reference for
assessing
prospects
as
opposed
to
directly
influencing
the
prefer-ence
for
risk
(cf.,
Kahneman
&
Tversky,
1979),
as
some
agency
models
contend
(Holmstrom
&
Milgrom, 1987). Further, executives' choices of risk also may be influenced by their
prior
suc-cess
at
selecting
risky
alternatives
(March
&
Shapira,
1987;
Webber
&
Milliman,
1997).
Taking
a
more
longitudinal
and
dynamic
view
of
risk
and
performance
may
enhance
our
explanation
of
agent
risk
taking
and
may
improve
explana-tions of firm performance resulting from mana-gerial choices.

In sum, agency theory's contribution to corpo-rate governance has been limited by its
simplis-tic
assumptions of
consistent
risk
aversion
among
agents,
its
modeling
of
a
recursive
influ- ence
from
risk
choice
on
performance,
and
its
inability
to
provide
unambiguous predictions of corporate governance's influence on executive behavior.
These
limitations
provide
both
a
chal-lenge
and
an
opportunity
for
us
to
improve
agency-based
models
of
managerial
risk
taking.
It
is
our
contention
that
the
recent
emergence of behavioral decision models of risk can contrib-ute directly to redressing
these limitations. Al-though the potential contribution of behavioral decision theory to
agency
theory
has
been
ac- knowledged
(Coffee,
1988;
Gomez-Mejia,
1994;
Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), scholars have not yet formally linked or integrated
it
with
the
parallel
agency-based
literature
on
the
same
subject.
In
this
article
we
integrate
behavioral
decision
theory
views
on
risk
with
agency
rela-tions
in
a
corporate governance context in order to develop a synthetic model of managerial risk
taking.
在代理和前景理论观点的基础上，
我们在本文中构建了一个执行风险 承担的行为
代理模型。
在该模型中，
我们将内部公司治理的要素与问题框架相结合，< br>以解释
执行风险承担行为。
该模型表明，
执行风险承担在不同形式的监控中不同 ，
并且
代理商可能表现出寻求风险以及规避风险的行为。
我们制定了具体的命题，将监
控与绩效和战略问题的框架相结合，
以解释执行战略风险的选择。
由此产生的 命
题增强并扩展了基于机构的公司执法风险承担治理文献。


“代理理论
......
[
通过其对委托人和代理人的风险态度的表达来表 征
”
（
Barney
＆
Hesterly
，
199 6
：
124
）
。具体而言，委托人在个人公司行为的偏好中被认为是风
险中性的，
因为他们可以在多个公司中分散他们的股权。
相反，
由于代理人的就业保障和收入与一家公司紧密相关，
因此为了降低个人财富风险，
代理人被假定
在 公司决策中避免风险规避（
Donaldson
，
1961; Williamson
，
1963
）
。然而，代理
人风险规避为风险中立的委托人创造了机 会成本，
他们更喜欢代理人最大化公司
的回报
（
Baysinger
，
Kosnik
，
＆
Turk
，
1991; Garen
，
1994; Hill
＆
Hansen
，
1989; Hill
，
Hitt
，＆
Hoskisson
，
1988; Hoskisson
，
Hitt
，＆
Hill
，
1992; Morck
，
Schleifer
，＆
Vishny
，
1988
）< br>。代理人和委托人之间的这种
“
风险差异
”
（
Beatty< br>＆
Zajac
，
1994;
Coffee
，
1988
）在委托

-
代理关系中产生了
“
道德风险
”
问题。公司治理的挑战是