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Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Jerry Falwell

No. 86-1278
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
485 U.S. 46
Argued December 2, 1987
Decided February 24, 1988

Syllabus
Respondent, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, filed a
diversity action in Federal District Court against petitioners, a nationally circulated magazine and
its publisher, to recover damages for, inter alia, libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from the publication of an advertisement
respondent as having engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.
The jury found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the parody could not

emotional distress claim, stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contention that the
of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254, must be met before respondent can recover for
emotional
distress.
Rejecting
as
irrelevant
the
contention
that,
because
the
jury
found
that
the
parody did not describe actual facts, the ad was an opinion protected by the First Amendment to
the
Federal
Constitution,
the
court
ruled
that
the
issue
was
whether
the
ad's
publication
was
sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Held:
In
order
to
protect
the
free
flow
of
ideas
and
opinions
on
matters
of
public
interest
and
concern, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and public officials from
recovering
damages
for
the
tort
of
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress
by
reason
of
the
publication
of
a
caricature
such
as
the
ad
parody
at
issue
without
showing
in
addition
that
the
publication
contains
a
false
statement
of
fact
which
was
made
with

malice,
i.e.,
with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
The State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny
First
Amendment
protection
to
speech
that
is
patently
offensive
and
is
intended
to
inflict
emotional
injury
when
that
speech
could
not
reasonably
have
been
interpreted
as
stating
actual
facts
about
the
public
figure
involved.
Here,
respondent
is
clearly
a

figure
for
First
Amendment
purposes,
and
the
lower
courts'
finding
that
the
ad
parody
was
not
reasonably
believable must be accepted.
has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of
the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression, and
cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages for conduct
such as that involved here. Pp. 50-57.
797 F. 2d 1270, reversed.
REHNQUIST,
C.J.,
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court,
in
which
BRENNAN,
MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, AND SCALIA, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion
concurring
in
the
judgment,
post,
p.
57.
KENNEDY
,
J.,
took
no
part
in
the
consideration
or
decision of the case.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner
Hustler
Magazine,
Inc.,
is
a
magazine
of
nationwide
circulation.
Respondent
Jerry
Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public
affairs, sued petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to recover damages for invasion of
[48] privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court directed a
verdict against respondent on the privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a jury. The
jury
found
for
petitioners
on
the
defamation
claim,
but
found
for
respondent
on
the
claim
for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded damages. We now consider whether this
award is consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a
advertisement
for
Campari
Liqueur
that
contained
the
name
and
picture
of
respondent
and
was
entitled
ads
that
included
interviews
with
various
celebrities
about
their

times.
Although
it
was
apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads
clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of
form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler's editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity
and drafted an alleged
drunken
incestuous
rendezvous
with
his
mother
in
an
outhouse.
The
Hustler
parody
portrays
respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who
preaches
only
when
he
is
drunk.
In
small
print
at
the
bottom
of
the
page,
the
ad
contains
the
disclaimer,
ad as
Soon after the November issue of Hustler became available to the public, respondent brought this
diversity
action
in
the
United
States
District
Court
for
the
Western
District
of
Virginia
against
Hustler
Magazine,
Inc.,
Larry
C.
Flynt,
and
Flynt
Distributing
Co.
Respondent
stated
in
his
complaint that publication of the ad parody in Hustler entitled [49] him to recover damages for
libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case proceeded to
trial.[note
1]
At
the
close
of
the
evidence,
the
District
Court
granted
a
directed
verdict
for
petitioners on the invasion of privacy claim. The jury then found against respondent on the libel
claim, specifically finding that the ad parody could not
actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.
C1.
The
jury
ruled
for
respondent
on
the
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress
claim,
however
and
stated
that
he
should
be
awarded
$$100,000
in
compensatory
damages,
as
well
as
$$50,000
each
in
punitive
damages
from
petitioners.[note
2]
Petitioners'
motion
for
judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was denied.
On
appeal,
the
United
States
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Circuit
affirmed
the
judgment
against petitioners.
Falwell v. Flynt,
797 F. 2d 1270 (CA4 1986). The court rejected petitioners'
argument
that
the

malice
standard
of
New
York
Times
Co.
v.
Sullivan,

376
U.
S.
254
(1964), must be met before respondent can recover for emotional distress. The court agreed that
because respondent is concededly a public figure, petitioners are
amendment
protection
in
the
claim
for
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress
that
they
received in [respondent's] claim for libel.
application of the actual malice rule is appropriate in the context of an emotional distress claim. In
the court's view, the
New York Times
decision emphasized the constitutional importance not of the
falsity of the statement or the defendant's disregard for the truth, but of the heightened level of
culpability
embodied
in
the
requirement
of

or
reckless
conduct.
Here,
the
New
York [50] Times standard is satisfied by the state-law requirement, and the jury's finding, that the
defendants have acted intentionally or recklessly.[note 3] The Court of Appeals then went on to
reject the contention that because the jury found that the ad parody did not describe actual facts
about respondent, the ad was an opinion that is protected by the First Amendment. As the court put
it, this was
to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.,
at 1276.[note 4 ]Petitioners then filed
a petition for rehearing en banc, but this was denied by a divided court. Given the importance of
the constitutional issues involved, we granted certiorari. 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State's
authority
to
protect
its
citizens
from
the
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress.
We
must
decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication
of
an
ad
parody
offensive
to
him,
and
doubtless
gross
and
repugnant
in
the
eyes
of
most.
Respondent would have us find that a State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional
distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is
intended
to
inflict
emotional
injury,
even
when
that
speech
could
not
reasonably
have
been
interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.
one's
mind
is
not
only
an
aspect
of
individual
liberty--and
thus
a
good
unto
itself--but
also
is
essential
to
the
common
quest
for
truth
and
the
vitality
of
society
as
a
whole.
Bose
Corp.
v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U. S. 485, 503-504 (1984). We have therefore been
particularly
vigilant
to
ensure
that
individual
expressions
of
ideas
remain
free
from
governmentally
imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a
idea.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323, 339 (1974). As Justice Holmes wrote,
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they
believe
the
very
foundations
of
their
own
conduct
that
the
ultimate
good
desired
is
better
reached by free trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .
Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919)
(dissenting opinion).
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech
that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern
to
society
at
large.
Associated
Press
v.
Walker

decided
with
Curtis
Publishing
Co.
v.
Butts,

388
U.
S.
130,
164
(1967)
(Warren,
C.J.,
concurring
in
result).
Justice
Frankfurter
put
it
succinctly in
Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U. S. 665, 673-674 (1944), when he said that
of
the
prerogatives
of
American
citizenship
is
the
right
to
criticize
public
men
and
measures.
Such
criticism,
inevitably,
will
not
always
be
reasoned
or
moderate;
public
figures
as
well
as
public officials will be subject to
New
York
Times,

supra,

at
270.

candidate
who
vaunts
his
spotless
record
and
sterling
integrity cannot convincingly cry 'Foul!' when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts [52]