2021年1月23日发(作者：当下)
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Groundless Beliefs
By A. E. Mander
In
future
we
are
going
to
follow
the
practice
—
until
it
becomes
a
habit
—
of
classifying propositions according to their grounds. Of every statement we come across,
we
shall
ask:
“How
do
we
know
that?
What
reason
have
we
for

believing
that?
On
what ‘ground’ is that statement based?” Probably we shall be astonished at the number
of propositions met with in everyday life which we shall find it necessary to class as
groundless.
They
rest
upon
mere
tradition,
or
on
somebody’s
bar
e
assertion
unsupported by ever a shadow of proof …

It
may
be
a
belief
which
we
originally
accepted
as
a
result
of
simple
“suggestion,” and
we have continued to hold it ever since. It has now become one of
our
regular
habits
of
thought.
Perhaps
somebody-somewhere-sometime
told
us
a
certain thing, and quite uncritically, we accepted and believed it. Perhaps it was way
back in our early childhood
—
before we had even developed the power of questioning
anything that might be told to us. Many of our strongest convictions were established
then; and now, in adult life, we find it most difficult even to question their truth. They
seem to us “obviously” true.

But if the staunchest Roman Catholic and the staunchest Presbyterian had been
exchanged
when
infants,
and
if
they
had
been
brought
up
with
home
and
all
other
influences reversed, we can had very little doubt what the result would have been. It is
consistent
with
all
our
knowledge
of
psychology
to
conclude
that
each
would
have
grown up holding exactly the opposite
beliefs to those he holds now … and each would
then have felt as sure of the truth of his opinion as he now feels
—
of the truth of the
opposite opinion. The same thing is true, of course, of many beliefs other than those of
a
religious
nature.
If
we
had
grown
up
in
a
community
where
polygamy
or
head-hunting,
or
infanticide,
or
gladiatorial
fighting,
or
dueling,
was
regarded
as
the
normal and natural thing
—then we should have grown up to regard it as “obviously”
natural
and
perfectly
moral
and
proper.
If
an
English
baby
had
been
adopted
and
brought up in a German home, and had grown up with no knowledge that his parents
were English,
all the sentiments and beliefs of that person would be “German” and not
“English.”
Many
of
our
beliefs—
many
of
our
most
deeply-rooted
and
fundamental
convictions
—
are
held
simply
as
a
result
of
the
fact
that
we
happen
to
have
been
“brought up” to them.

Of course we do not cease, when we cease to be children, to adopt new beliefs on
mere suggestion. We continue doing it, more or less unconsciously all our lives; hence,
to take only the most striking examples, the enormous influence of newspapers and the
effectiveness
of
skilful
advertising.
Much
of
what
passes
as
such
is
not,
strictly,
thinking at all. It is the mere “parroting” of id
eas picked up by chance and adopted as
our own without question. Most people, most of the time, are mere parrots. But as we
leave
childhood,
we
tend
to
accept
only
such
new
ideas
as
fit
in
with
the
ideas
we
already hold; and all conflicting ideas seem to u
s “obviously” absurd.

Propositions
that
are
accepted
simply
because
“everybody
says
so,”
must
be
classed
under
the
same
heading.
The
dogma
may
not
be
that
of
any
particular
individual: it may be a dogmatic statement which has been passed from one person to
another,
from
generation
to
generation,
perhaps
for
hundreds
—
perhaps
for
thousands
—
of years. It may be part of the tradition belief of the people or the race. In
that
case,
it
is
part
of
our
social
inheritance
from
some
period
in
the
past.
But
we
should
fully
face
the
fact
that
beliefs
which
are
merely
inherited
from
the
past
must
have originated at a time when men knew much less than they know today. So the fact
that a belief is “old” is no argument in its favour.

We need especially to be on our guard when we come across propositions which
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seem to be “obviously” true.

When we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about which there is
a feeling
that even to enquire into it would be absurd, unnecessary, undesirable, or wicked
—
we
may know that that opinion is a non-rational one.
When we are tempted to say that any general truth is so “obvious” that it would
be
absurd
even
to
question
it,
we
should
remember
that
the
whole
history
of
the
development of human thought has been full of cases of such “obvious truths” breaking
down when examined in the light of increasing knowledge and reason. For instance, for
ages nothing could have seemed more obvious, more utterly beyond question that the
proposition
that
slavery
was
natural,
reasonable,
necessary,
and
right.
Some
kinds
of
men were “obviously” “slaves by nature.” To doubt it was impossible.

Again
for
more
than
two
thousand
years,
it
was
“impossible
to
conceive”
the
planets as moving in paths other than circles. The circle was “obviously”
the perfect
figure; and so
it was “natural” and “inevitable” to suppose that the planets moved in
circles. The
age-long struggle of the
greatest
intellects
in
the world
to
shake off that
assumption is one of the marvels of history.

It was formerly “obvious” that the heart—
and not the brain
—
was the organ of
consciousness. To most people today it seems equally “obvious” that we think with our
brains. Many modern persons find it very difficult to credit the fact that men can even
have supposed otherwise. Yet
—
they did.
That the earth must be flat, formerly seemed so obvious and self-evident that the
very
suggestion
of
any
other
possibility
would
have
been
—
and
was
—
regarded
as
a
joke.
It
was
for
two
thousand
years
“taken
for
granted”
as
“obvious”
that
a
heavy
weight must fall faster than a light one. An assumed or dogmatic proposition which had
been universally accepted as
“obvious;” and which, when challenged,
was supported
by reference to a dogma of Aristotle. Until Galileo actually demonstrated the contrary,
nothing could have seemed more beyond possibility or doubt.
Propositions
which
are
accepted
blindly,
without
question
on
the
grounds
of
mere assumption or dogma, need to be frankly recognized as such. Progress in human
thought seems to consist mainly in getting rid of such ideas.
Other
beliefs
are
held
through
self-interest.
Modern
psychology
leaves
us
no
room for doubt on this point. We adopt and cling to some beliefs because
—
or partly
because
—it “pays” us to do so. But, as a rule, the person concerned is about the last
person in the world to be able to recognize this in himself. Indeed, he would probably
be
highly
indignant
if
told
of
what
anyone
familiar
with
modern
psychology
can
recognize
plainly.
It
would
be
quite
wrong
to
attribute
all
opinions
—
even
political
opinions
—
to self-interest. But it would be equally wrong to deny that this is one potent
factor.
“Self
-
interest”
is
to
be
understood
first
in
the
ordinary
sense,
as
referring
to
a
man’s way of earning his livelihood and acquiring wealth. But we may extend the term
to cover also his interest in social position; popularity with his fellows; the respect and
goodwill of those whose respect
and
goodwill he values.
It covers his
interest
in
his
own career, in whatever prestige he enjoys as one of the leaders
—
or at least as a valued
supporter
—
of some movement or institution, some religious body, some other kind of
society or group. There is many a man who is unconsciously compelled to cling to a
belief
because
he
is
a
“somebody”
in
some
circle—
and
if
he
were
to
abandon
that
belief, he would find himself nobody at all.
Putting
it
broadly,
we
should
always
suspect
any
of
our
opinions
when
we
recognize
that
our
happiness
depends,
directly
or
indirectly,
upon
our
continuing
to
hold
them
—
when
we
might
lose
anything,
material
or
otherwise,
by
changing
our
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