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2021-02-05 15:42
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2021年2月5日发(作者:既然)


The Core Competence of the Corporation


C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel



The


most


powerful


way


to


prevail


in


global


competition


is


still


invisible


to


many


companies.


During


the


1980s,


top


executives


were


judged


on


their


ability


to


restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on


their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth


possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself.


Consider


the


last


ten


years


of


GTE


and


NEC.


In


the


early


1980s,


GTE


was


well


positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry.


It


was


active


in


telecommunications.


Its


operations


spanned


a


variety


of


businesses


including


telephones,


switching


and


transmission


systems,


digital


PABX,


semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products.


And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a


position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $$9.98 billion, and


net cash flow was $$1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $$3.8 billion in


sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no


experience as an operating telecommunications company.




Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $$16.46


billion,


and


NEC’s


sales


were


considerably


higher


at


$$21.89


billion.


GTE


has,


in


effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting


products.


GTE's


other


businesses


are


small


in


global


terms.


GTE


has


divested


Sylvania


TV


and


Telenet,


put


switching,


transmission,


and


digital


PABX


into


joint


ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of


GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to


15% between 1980 and 1988.




NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in


telecommunications


products


and


computers.


It


has


consolidated


its


position


in


mainframe


computers.


It


has


moved


beyond


public


switching


and


transmission


to


include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop


computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC


is


the


only


company


in


the


world


to


be


in


the


top


five


in


revenue


in


telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies,


starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because


NEC conceived of itself in terms of


Rethinking the Corporation





Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular


end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But


with market


boundaries


changing


ever


more


quickly,


targets


are


elusive


and


capture


is


at


best


temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets,


quickly


entering


emerging


markets,


and


dramatically


shifting


patterns


of


customer


choice


in


established


markets.


These


are


the


ones


to


emulate.


The


critical


task


for


management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible


functionality


or,


better


yet,


creating


products


that


customers


need


but


have


not


yet


even imagined.




This


is


a


deceptively


difficult


task.


Ultimately,


it


requires


radical


change


in


the


management


of


major


companies.


It


means,


first


of


all,


that


top


managements


of


Western


companies


must


assume


responsibility


for


competitive


decline.


Everyone


knows


about


high


interest


rates,


Japanese


protectionism,


outdated


antitrust


laws,


obstreperous


unions,


and


impatient


investors.


What


is


harder


to


see,


or


harder


to


acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or


macroeconomic


created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in


need of reform.




NEC


versus


GTE,


again,


is


instructive


and


only


one


of


many


such


comparative


cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the


1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and


communications,


what


it


called



Success,


top


management


reckoned,


would


hinge


on


acquiring


competencies,


particularly


in


semiconductors.


Management


adopted


an


appropriate



archi tecture,


summarized


by


C&C,


and


then


communicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the


mid 1970s.




NEC constituted a


of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and


committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its


strategic


architecture,


NEC


shifted


enormous


resources


to


strengthen


its


position


in


components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply


internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies.




NEC


carefully


identified


three


interrelated


streams


of


technological


and


market


evolution.


Top


management


determined


that


computing


would


evolve


from


large


mainframes


to


distributed


processing,


components


from


simple


ICs


to


VLSI,


and


communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we


now


call


ISDN.


As


things


evolved


further,


NEC


reasoned,


the


computing,


communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very


hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for


any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets.





NEC


top


management


determined


that


semiconductors


would


be


the


company's


most important


of


1987


aimed


at


building


competencies


rapidly


and


at


low


cost.


In


mainframe


computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the


collaborative


arrangements


in


the


semiconductor


component


field


were


oriented


toward


technology


access.


As


they


entered


collabor


ative


arrangements,


NEC’s


operating


managers


understood


the


rationale


for


these


alliances


and


the


goal


of


internalizing


partner


skills.


NEC's


director


of


research


summed


up


its


competence


acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way:


was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a need for us


to develop new ideas.”





No


such


clarity


of


strategic


intent


and


strategic


architecture


appeared


to


exist


at


GTE.


Although


senior


executives


discussed


the


implications


of


the


evolving


information technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies


would


be


required


to


compete


in


that


industry


were


communicated


widely.


While


significant


staff


work


was


done


to


identify


key


technologies,


senior


line


managers


continued


to


act


as


if


they


were


managing


independent


business


units.


Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual


businesses


became


increasingly


dependent


on


outsiders


for


critical


skills,


and


collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in


place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in


telecommunications services.


The Roots of Competitive Advantage




The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a


portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many


industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that


with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low


cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at


which


Japanese


rivals


are


inventing


new


markets,


creating


new


products,


and


enhancing


them.


Canon


has


given


us


personal


copiers;


Honda


has


moved


from


motorcycles


to


four


wheel


off


road


buggies.


Sony


developed


the


8mm


camcorder,


Yamaha,


the


digital


piano.


Komatsu


developed


an


underwater


remote


controlled


bulldozer,


while


Casio's


latest


gambit


is


a


small


screen


color


LCD


television.


Who


would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?




In more established markets,


the Japanese


challenge has been just as


disquieting.


Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements


that bring technological


sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers


have


been


pioneering


four


wheel


steering,


four


valve-per


cylinder


engines,


in


car


navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the


strength


of


its


product


features,


Canon


is


now


a


player


in


facsimile


transmission


machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.




In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance


attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition,


Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards


for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and


less important as sources of differential advantage.


In the long run, competitiveness


derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the


core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage


are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and


production


skills


into


competencies


that


empower


individual


businesses


to


adapt


quickly to changing opportunities.




Senior


executives


who


claim


that


they


cannot


build


core


competencies


either


because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet


are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western


companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan


nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their


adherence


to


a


concept


of


the


corporation


that


unnecessarily


limits


the


ability


of


individual


businesses


to


fully


exploit


the


deep


reservoir


of


technological


capability


that many American and European companies possess.




The


diversified


corporation


is


a


large


tree.


The


trunk


and


major


limbs


are


core


products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end


products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the


core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their


end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its


leaves. (See the chart


Competitiveness.”)





Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to


coordinate


diverse


production


skills


and


integrate


multiple


streams


of


technologies.


Consider


Sony's


capacity


to


miniaturize


or


Philips's


optical


media


expertise.


The


theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the


skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat,


Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material


science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card


calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.




If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the


organization


of


work


and


the


delivery


of


value.


Among


Sony's


competencies


is


miniaturization.


To


bring


miniaturization


to


its


products,


Sony


must


ensure


that


technologists,


engineers,


and


marketers


have


a


shared


understanding


of


customer


needs


and


of


technological


possibilities.


The


force


of


core


competence


is


felt


as


decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in


an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its


competence


in


provided


the


company


the


means


to


differentiate


itself


from


many


financial service institutions.




Core


competence


is


communication,


involvement,


and


a


deep


commitment


to


working across organizational boundaries.


It involves many levels of people and all


functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in


corporate


laboratories


without


having


an


impact


on


any


of


the


businesses


of


the


company.


The


skills


that


together


constitute


core


competence


must


coalesce


around


individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the


opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and


interesting ways.




Core


competence


does


not


diminish


with


use.


Unlike


physical


assets,


which


do


deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But


competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used.


Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for


new


business


development.


Patterns


of


diversification


and


market


entry


may


be


guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.




Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse


as



it


notes,


magnetic


tape,


photographic


film,


pressure


sensitive


tapes,


and


coated


abrasives,


the


company


has


brought


to


bear


widely


shared


competencies


in


substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed,


3M


has


invested


consistently


in


them.


What


seems


to


be


an


extremely


diversified


portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies.




In


contrast,


there


are


major


companies


that


have


had


the


potential


to


build


core


competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of


the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much


of


its


consumer


electronics


business


to


Thomson


of


France,


arguing


that


it


was


becoming


increasingly


difficult


to


maintain


its


competitiveness


in


this


sector.


That


was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors


who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and


Thomson,


which


was


eager


to


build


its


competence


in


microelectronics


and


had


learned


from


the


Japanese


that


a


position


in


consumer


electronics


was


vital


to


this


challenge.




Management


trapped


in


the


strategic


business


unit


(SBU)


mind


set


almost


inevitably


finds


its


individual


businesses


dependent


on


external


sources


for


critical


components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They


are


core


products


that


contribute


to


the


competitiveness


of


a


wide


range


of


end


products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.


How Not to Think of Competence




Since


companies


are


in


a


race


to


build


the


competencies


that


determine


global


leadership,


successful


companies


have


stopped


imagining


themselves


as


bundles


of


businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over


portfolios


of


businesses


unrelated


in


terms


of


customers,


distribution


channels,


and


merchandising strategy.


Indeed, they have portfolios


that may seem


idiosyncratic at


times:


NEC


is


the


only


global


company


to


be


among


leaders


in


computing,


telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics


business.




But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems


integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate


businesses


become


coherent.


It


is


Honda's


core


competence


in


engines


and


power


trains


that


gives


it


a


distinctive


advantage


in


car,


motorcycle,


lawn


mower,


and


generator


businesses.


Canon's


core


competencies


in


optics,


imaging,


and


microprocessor


controls


have


enabled


it


to


enter,


even


dominate,


markets


as


seemingly


diverse


as


copiers,


laser


printers,


cameras,


and


image


scanners.


Philips


worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as


did


JVC


in


building


a


leading


position


in


video


recording.


Other


examples


of


core


competencies


might


include


mechantronics


(the


ability


to


marry


mechanical


and


electronic


engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics.


In the


early


stages


of


its


competence


building,


Philips


could


not


have


imagined


all


the


products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have


anticipated


miniature


camcorders


when


it


first


began


exploring


videotape


technologies.




Unlike


the


battle


for


global


brand


dominance,


which


is


visible


in


the


world's


bro


adcast and print media and is aimed at building global


to


build


world


class


competencies


is


invisible


to


people


who


aren't


deliberately


looking


for


it.


Top


management


often


tracks


the


cost


and


quality


of


competitors'


products,


yet


how


many


managers


untangle


the


web


of


alliances


their


Japanese


competitors


have


constructed


to


acquire


competencies


at


low


cost?


In


how


many


Western


boardrooms


is


there


an


explicit,


shared


understanding


of


the


competencies


the company must build for world


leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives


discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business


and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?




Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on


research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit


market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small


fraction


of


Xerox's.


Over


the


past


20


years,


NEC


has


spent


less


on


R&D


as


a


percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.




Nor does


core


competence mean shared


costs, as when two or more SBUs use


a


common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component.


The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a


post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated


effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow.




Building


core


competencies


is


more


ambitious


and


different


than


integrating


vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end


products


and look


upstream


to


the efficiencies of the supply


chain


and downstream


toward


distribution


and


customers.


They


do


not


take


inventory


of


skills


and


look


forward


to


applying


them


in


nontraditional


ways.


(Of


course,


decisions


about


competencies


do


provide


a


logic


for


vertical


integration.


Canon


is


not


particularly


integrated


in


its


copier


business,


except


in


those


aspects


of


the


vertical


chain


that


Support the competencies it regards as critical.)


Identifying Core Competencies And Losing Them




At least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. First,


a


core


competence


provides


potential


access


to


a


wide


variety


of


markets.


Competence in display systems, for example, enables a company to participate in such


diverse businesses as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers,


and automotive dashboards which is why Casio's entry into the handheld TV market


was predictable. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to


the perceived customer benefits of the end product. Clearly, Honda's engine expertise


fills this bill.




Finally,


a


core


competence


should


be


difficult


for


competitors


to


imitate.


And


it


will


be


difficult


if


it


is


a


complex


harmonization


of


individual


technologies


and


production skills.


A rival


might


acquire some of the technologies that comprise the


core


competence,


but


it


will


find


it


more


difficult


to


duplicate


the


more


or


less


comprehensive


pattern


of


internal


coordination


and


learning.


JVC’s


decision


in


the


early


1960s


to


pursue


the


development


of


a


videotape


competence


passed


the


three


tests outlined here. RCA’s decis


ion in the late 1970s to develop a stylus based video


turntable system did not.




Few


companies


are


likely


to


build


world


leadership


in


more


than


five


or


six


fundamental competencies. A company that compiles a list of 20 to 30 capabilities has


probably


not


produced


a


list


of


core


competencies.


Still,


it


is


probably


a


good


discipline to generate a list of this sort and to see aggregate capabilities as building


blocks.


This


tends


to


prompt


the


search


for


licensing


deals


and


alliances


through


which the company may acquire, at low cost, the missing pieces.




Most Western companies hardly think about competitiveness in these terms at all. It


is


time


to


take


a


tough


minded


look


at


the


risks


they


are


running.


Companies


that


judge


competitiveness,


their


own


and


their


competitors',


primarily


in


terms


of


the


price/performance of end products are courting the erosion of core competencies



or


making too little effort to enhance them. The embedded skills that give rise to the next


generation


of


competitive


products


cannot


be



in


by


outsourcing


and


OEM-supply


relationships.


In


our


view,


too


many


companies


have


unwittingly


surrendered


core


competencies


when


they


cut


internal


investment


in


what


they


mistakenly thought were just




Consider Chrysler. Unlike Honda, it has tended to view engines and power trains as


simply


one


more


component.


Chrysler


is


becoming


increasingly


dependent


on


Mitsubishi and Hyundai: between 1985 and 1987, the number of outsourced engines


went


from


252,000


to


382,000.


It


is


difficult


to


imagine


Honda


yielding


manufacturing responsibility, much less design, of so critical a part of a car's function


to an outside company which is why Honda has made such an enormous commitment


to


Formula


One


auto


racing.


Honda


has


been


able


to


pool


its


engine


related


technologies;


it has parlayed these into a corporate wide competency from


which it


develops world beating products, despite R&D budgets smaller than those of GM and


Toyota.




Of course, it is perfectly possible for a company to have a competitive product line


up but be a laggard in developing core competencies at least for a while. If a company


wanted to enter the copier business today, it would find a dozen Japanese companies


more than willing to supply copiers on the basis of an OEM private label. But when


fundamental


technologies


changed


or


if


its


supplier


decided


to


enter


the


market


directly and become a competitor, that company's product line, along with all of its


investments


in


marketing


and


distribution,


could


be


vulnerable.


Outsourcing


can


provide a shortcut to a more competitive product, but it typically contributes little to


building the people embodied skills that are needed to sustain product leadership.




Nor is it possible for a company to have an intelligent alliance or sourcing strategy


if it has not made a choice about where it will build competence leadership. Clearly,


Japanese companies have benefited from alliances. They've used them to learn from


Western partners who were not fully committed to preserving core competencies of


their own. As we've argued in these pages before, learning within an alliance takes a


positive


commitment


of


resources-


travel,


a


pool


of


dedicated


people,


test


bed


facilities,


time


to


internalize


and


test


what


has


been


learned.


A


company


may


not


make this effort if it doesn't have clear goals for competence building.




Another way of losing is forgoing opportunities to establish competencies that are


evolving


in


existing


businesses.


In


the


1970s


and


1980s,


many


American


and


European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE, Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color


television


business,


which


they


regarded


as


mature.


If


by



they


meant


that


they


had


run


out


of


new


product


ideas


at


precisely


the


moment


global


rivals


had


targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the industry was mature. But it certainly


wasn't


mature


in


the


sense


that


all


opportunities


to


enhance


and


apply


video


based


competencies had been exhausted.




In


ridding


themselves


of


their


television


businesses,


these


companies


failed


to


distinguish


between


divesting


the


business


and


destroying


their


video


media


based


competencies. They not only got out of the TV business but they also closed the door


on a whole stream of future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The


television


industry,


considered


by


many


U.S.


companies


in


the


1970s


to


be


unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate about the inability of


U.S. corporations to benefit from the $$20 billion a year opportunity that HDTV will


represent in the mid to late 1990s. Ironically, the U.S. government is being asked to


fund


a


massive


research


project


in


effect,


to


compensate


U.S.


companies


for


their


failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the chance.




In


contrast,


one


can


see


a


company


like


Sony


reducing


its


emphasis


on


VCRs


(where it has not been very successful and where Korean companies now threaten),


without reducing its commitment to video related competencies. Sony's Betamax led


to a debacle. But it emerged with its videotape recording competencies intact and is


currently challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market.




There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be


only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the bath water in


divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are built through a process of


continuous


improvement


and


enhancement


that


may


span


a


decade


or


longer,


a


company


that


has


failed


to


invest


in


core


competence


building


will


find


it


very


difficult to, enter an emerging market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to


serve as a distribution channel.




American semiconductor companies like Motorola learned this painful lesson when


they


elected


to


forgo


direct


participation


in


the


256k


generation


of


DRAM


chips.


Having skipped this round, Motorola, like most of its American competitors, needed a


large


infusion


of


technical


help


from


Japanese


partners


to


rejoin


the


battle


in


the


1


megabyte generation. When it comes to core competencies, it is difficult to get off the


train, walk to the next station, and then reboard.


From Core Competencies to Core Products.




The tangible link between identified core competencies and end products is what


we


call


the


core


products-


the


physical


embodiments


of


one


or


more


core


competencies.


Honda's


engines,


for


example,


are


core


products,


linchpins


between


design and development skills that ultimately lead to a proliferation of end products.


Core


products


are


the


components


or


subassemblies


that


actually


contribute


to


the


value


of


the


end


products.


Thinking


in


terms


of core


products


forces


a


company


to


distinguish between the brand share it achieves in end product markets (for example,


40% of the U.S. refrigerator market) and the manufacturing share it achieves in any


particular core product (for example, 5% of the world share of compressor output).




Canon


is


reputed


to


have


an


84%


world


manufacturing


share


in


desktop


laser


printer



even


though


its


brand


share


in


the


laser


printer


business


is


minuscule.


Similarly,


Matsushita


has


a


world


manufacturing


share


of


about


45%


in


key VCR components, far in excess of its brandshare (Panasonic, JVC, and others) of


20%.


And


Matsushita


has


a


commanding


core


product


share


in


compressors


worldwide, estimated at 40%, even though its brand share in both the air conditioning


and refrigerator businesses is quite small.




It is


essential to make this distinction


between core competencies, core products,


and end products because global competition is played out by different rules and for


different


stakes


at


each


level.


To


build


or


defend


leadership


over


the


long


term,


a


corporation will probably be a winner at each level. At the level of core competence,


the


goal


is


to


build


world


leadership


in


the


design


and


development


of


a


particular


class


of


product


functionality


be


it


compact


data


storage


and


retrieval,


as


with


Philips's optical media competence, or compactness and ease of use, as with Sony's


micromotors and microprocessor controls.




To sustain leadership in their chosen core competence areas, these companies seek


to


maximize


their


world


manufacturing


share


in


core


products.


The


manufacture


of


core


products


for


a


wide


variety


of


external


(and


internal)


customers


yields


the


revenue and market feedback that, at least partly, determines the pace at which core


competencies


can


be


enhanced


and


extended.


This


thinking


was


behind


JVC's


decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply relationships with leading national


consumer


electronics


companies


in


Europe


and


the


United


States.


In


supplying


Thomson, Thorn, and Telefunken (all independent companies at that time) as well as


U.S. partners, JVC was able to gain the cash and the diversity of market experience


that ultimately enabled it to outpace Philips and Sony. (Philips developed videotape


competencies in parallel with JVC, but it failed to build a worldwide network of OEM


relationships that would have allowed it to accelerate the refinement of its videotape


competence through the sale of core products.)




JVC's success has not been lost on Korean compames like Goldstar, Sam Sung, Kia,


and Daewoo, who are building core product leadership in areas as diverse as displays,


semiconductors,


and


automotive


engines


through


their


OEM


supply


contracts


with


Western companies. Their avowed goal is to capture investment initiative away from


potential


competitors,


often


U.S.


companies.


In


doing


so,


they


accelerate


their


competence building efforts while


competence


and


embedding


it


in


core


products,


Asian


competitors


have


built


up


advantages


in


component


markets


first


and


have


then


leveraged


off


their


superior


products to move downstream to build brand share. And they are not likely to remain


the low cost suppliers forever. As their reputation for brand leadership is consolidated,


they may well gain price leadership. Honda has proven this with its Acura line, and


other Japanese car makers are following suit.




Control over core products is critical for other reasons. A dominant position in core


products


allows a company to


shape the evolution


of applications


and end markets.


Such compact audio disc related core products as data drives and lasers have enabled


Sony


and


Philips


to


influence


the


evolution


of


the


computer


peripheral


business


in


optical media storage. As a company multiplies the number of application arenas for


its


core


products,


it


can


consistently


reduce


the


cost,


time,


and


risk


in


new


product


development. In short, well targeted core products can lead to economies of scale and


scope.


Two Concepts of the Corporation:


SBU or Core Competence




SBU Core Competence Basis for competition Competitiveness of today’s products


Interfirm


competition


to


build


competencies


Corporate


structure


Portfolio


of


businesses related in product-market terms Portfolio of competencies, core products,


and businesses Status of the business unit Autonomy is sacrosanct; the SBU “owns”


all


resources


other


than


cash


SBU


is


a


potential


reservoir


of


core


competencies


Resource


allocation


Discrete


businesses


are


the


unit


of


analysis,


capital


is


allocated


business


by


business


Businesses


and


competencies


are


the


unit


of


analysis:


top


management allocates capital and talent Value added of top management Optimizing


corporate returns through capital allocation trade-offs among businesses Enunciating


strategic architecture and building competencies to secure the future


The Tyranny of the SBU





The new terms


of competitive engagement cannot


be understood using analytical


tools devised to manage the diversified corporation of 20 years ago, when competition


was primarily domestic (GE versus Westinghouse, General Motors versus Ford) and


all


the


key


players


were


speaking


the


language


of


the


same


business


schools


and


consultancies. Old prescriptions have potentially toxic side effects. The need for new


principles


is


most


obvious


in


companies


the


corporation


are


summarized


in



Concepts of the Corporation: SBU or Core Competence.”





Obviously, diversified corporations have a portfolio of products and a portfolio of


businesses. But we believe in a view of the company as a portfolio of competencies as


well. U.S. companies do not lack the technical resources to build competencies, but


their


top


management


often


lacks


the


vision


to


build


them


and


the


administrative


means


for


assembling


resources


spread


across


multiple


businesses.


A


shift


in


commitment


will


inevitably


influence


patterns


of


diversification,


skill


deployment,


resource allocation priorities, and approaches to alliances and outsourcing.




We have described the three different planes on which battles for global leadership


are


waged


core


competence,


core


products,


and


end


products.


A


corporation


has


to


know whether it is winning or losing on each plane. By sheer weight of investment, a


company might be able to beat its rivals to blue sky technologies yet still lose the race


to build core competence leadership. If a company is winning the race to build core


competencies (as opposed to building leadership in a few technologies), it will almost


certainly


outpace


rivals


in


new


business


development.


If


a


company


is


winning


the


race to capture world manufacturing share in core products, it will probably outpace


rivals in improving product features and the price/performance ratio.




Determining whether one is winning or losing end product battles is more difficult


because


measures


of


product


market


share


do


not


necessarily


reflect


various


companies'


underlying


competitiveness.


Indeed,


companies


that


attempt


to


build


market share by relying on the competitiveness of others, rather than investing in core


competencies


and


world


core- product


leadership,


may


be


treading


on


quicksand.


In


the


race


for


global


brand


dominance,


companies


like


3M,


Black


&


Decker,


Canon,


Honda, NEC, and Citicorp have built global brand umbrellas by proliferating products


out of their core competencies. This has allowed their individual businesses to build


image, customer loyalty, and access to distribution channels.




When you think about this reconceptualization of the corporation, the primacy of


the


SBU


an


organizational


dogma


for


a


generation


is


now


clearly


an


anachronism.


Where the SBU is an article of faith, resistance to the seductions of decentralization


can seem heretical. In many companies, the SBU prism means that only one plane of


the global competitive battle, the battle to put competitive products on the shelf today,


is visible to top management. What are the costs of this distortion?




Under investment in Developing Core Competencies and Core Products. When the


organization is conceived of as a multiplicity of SBUs, no single business may feel


responsible for maintaining a viable position in core products nor be able to justify the


investment


required


to


build


world


leadership


in


some


core


competence.


In


the


absence


of


a


more


comprehensive


view


imposed


by


corporate


management,


SBU


managers will tend to under invest. Recently, companies such as Kodak and Philips


have


recognized


this


as


a


potential


problem


and


have


begun


searching


for


new


organizational forms that will allow them to develop and manufacture core products


for both internal and external customers.




SBU managers have traditionally conceived of competitors in the same way they've


seen themselves. On the whole, they've failed to note the emphasis Asian competitors


were


placing


on


building


leadership


in


core


products


or


to


understand


the


critical


linkage


between


world


manufacturing


leadership


and


the


ability


to


sustain


development


pace


core


competence.


They've


failed


to


pursue


OEM


supply


opportunities or to look across their various product divisions in an attempt to identify


opportunities for coordinated initiatives.




Imprisoned Resources. As an SBU evolves, it often develops unique competencies.


Typically, the people who embody this competence are seen as the sole property of


the business in which they grew up. The manager of another SBU who asks to borrow


talented people is likely to get a cold rebuff. SBU managers are not only unwilling to


lend


their


competence


carriers


but


they


may


actually


hide


talent


to


prevent


its


redeployment in the pursuit of new opportunities. This may be compared to residents


of an underdeveloped country hiding most of their cash under their mattresses. The


benefits


of


competencies,


like


the


benefits


of


the


money


supply,


depend


on


the


velocity of their circulation as well as on the size of the stock the company holds.




Western companies have traditionally had an advantage in the stock of skills they


possess.


But,


have


they


been


able


to


reconfigure


them


quickly


to


respond


to


new


opportunities?


Canon,


NEC,


and


Honda


have


had


a


lesser


stock


of


the


people


and


technologies


that


compose


core


competencies


but


could


move


them


much


quicker


from


one


business


unit


to


another.


Corporate


R&D


spending


at


Canon


is


not


fully


indicative of the size of Canon's core competence stock and tells the casual observer


nothing about


the velocity with


which Canon is


able to


move core competencies to


exploit opportunities.




When competencies become imprisoned, the people who carry the competencies do


not get assigned to the most exciting opportunities, and their skills begin to atrophy.


Only by fully leveraging core competencies can small companies like Canon afford to


compete with industry giants like Xerox. How strange that SBU managers, who are


perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting process, are unwilling to


compete


for


people


the


company's


most


precious


asset.


We


find


it


ironic


that


top


management devotes so much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically


has


no


comparable


mechanism


for


allocating


the


human


skills


that


embody


core


competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look four or five levels down into the


organization, identify the people who embody critical competencies, and move them


across organizational I boundaries.




Bounded Innovation. If core competencies are not recognized, individual SBUs will


pursue


only


those


innovation


opportunities


that


are


close


at


hand


marginal


product


line


extensions


or


geographic


expansions.


Hybrid


opportunities


like


fax


machines,


laptop


computers,


hand


held


televisions,


or


portable


music


keyboards


will


emerge


only when managers take off their SBU blinkers. Remember, Canon appeared to be in


the camera business at the time it was preparing to become a world leader in copiers.


Conceiving of the corporation in


terms


of core


competencies widens the


domain of


innovation.


Developing Strategic Architecture




The


fragmentation


of


core


competencies


becomes


inevitable


when


a


diversified


company's information systems, patterns of communication, career paths, managerial


rewards,


and


processes


of


strategy


development


do


not


transcend


SBU


lines.


We


believe


that


senior


management


should


spend


a


significant


amount


of


its


time


developing


a


corporatewide


strategic


architecture


that


establishes


objectives


for


competence


building.


A


strategic


architecture


is


a


road


map


of


the


future


that


identifies which core competencies to build and their constituent technologies.




By


providing


an


impetus


for


learning


from


alliances


and


a


focus


for


internal


development efforts, a strat


egic architecture like NEC’s C&C can dramatically reduce


the investment needed to secure future market leadership. How can a company make


partnerships intelligently without a clear understanding of the core competencies it is


trying


to


build


and


those


it


is


attempting


to


prevent


from


being


unintentionally


transferred?




Of course, all of this begs the question of what a strategic architecture should look


like. The answer will be different for every company. But it is helpful to think again


of


that


tree,


of


the


corporation


organized


around


core


products


and,


ultimately


core


competencies.


To


sink


sufficiently


strong


roots,


a


company


must


answer


some


fundamental


questions:


How


long


could


we


preserve


our


competitiveness


in


this


business


if


we


did


not


control


this


particular


core


competence?


How


central


is


this


core competence to perceived customer benefits? What future opportunities would be


foreclosed if we were to lose this particular competence?




The architecture provides a logic for product and market diversification, moreover.


An


SBU


manager


would


be


asked:


Does


the


new


market


opportunity


add


to


the


overall goal of becoming the best player in the world? Does it exploit or add to the


core competence? At Vickers, for example, diversification options have been judged


in the context of becoming the best power and motion control company in the world


(see the insert




The strategic architecture should make resource allocation priorities transparent to


the


entire


organization.


It


provides


a


template


for


allocation


decisions


by


top


management.


It


helps


lower


level


managers


understand


the


logic


of


allocation


priorities


and


disciplines


senior


management


to


maintain


consistency.


In


short,


it


yields


a


definition


of


the


company


and


the


markets


it


serves.


3M,


Vickers,


NEC,


Canon, and Honda all qualify on this score. Honda knew it was exploiting what it had


learned


from


motorcycles


how


to


make


high


revving,


smooth


running,


lightweight


engines when it entered the car business. The task of creating a strategic architecture


forces


the


organization


to


identify


and


commit


to


the


technical


and


production


linkages across SBUs that will provide a distinct competitive advantage.




It


is


consistency


of


resource


allocation


and


the


development


of


an


administrative


infrastructure


appropriate


to


it


that


breathes


life


into


a


strategic


architecture


and


creates


a


managerial


culture,


teamwork,


a


capacity


to


change,


and


a


willingness


to


share resources, to protect proprietary skills, and to think long term. That is also the


reason the specific architecture cannot be copied easily or overnight by competitors.


Strategic architecture is a tool for communicating with customers and other external


constituents. It reveals the broad direction without giving away every step.


Redeploying to Exploit Competencies




If the company's core competencies are its critical resource and if top management


must ensure that competence carriers are not held hostage by some particular business,


then it follows that SBUs should bid for core competencies in the same way they bid


for capital. We've made this point glancingly. It is important enough to consider more


deeply.




Once


top


management


(with


the


help


of


divisional


and


SBU


managers)


has


identified


overarching


competencies,


it


must


ask


businesses


to


identify


the


projects


and people closely connected with them. Corporate officers should direct an audit of


the location, number, and quality of the people who embody competence.




This


sends


an


important


signal


to


middle


managers:


core


competencies


are


corporate resources and may be reallocated by corporate management. An individual


business


doesn't


own


anybody.


SBUs


are


entitled


to


the


services


of


individual


employees


so


long


as


it


is


pursuing


yields


the


highest


possible


pay


off


on


the


investment


in


their


skills.


This


message


is


further


underlined


if


each


year


in


the


strategic planning or budgeting process, unit managers must justify their hold on the


people who carry the company's core competencies.




Elements


of


Canon's


core


competence


in


optics


are


spread


across


businesses


as


diverse as cameras, copiers, and semiconductor lithographic equipment and are shown


in


at Canon.” When Canon identified an opportunity in digital


laser printers, it gave SBU managers the right to raid other SBUS to pull together the


required pool of talent.


When Canon's reprographics products division undertook to


develop


microprocessor-controlled


copiers,


it


turned


to


the


photo


products


group,


which had developed the world's first microprocessor controlled camera.




Also, reward systems that focus only on product line results and career paths that


seldom


cross


SBU


boundaries


engender


patterns


of


behavior


among


unit


managers


that


are


destructively


competitive.


At


NEC,


divisional


managers


come


together


to


identify


next


generation


competencies.


Together


they


decide


how


much


investment


needs to be made to build up each future competency and the contribution in capital


and


staff


support


that


each


division


will


need


to


make.


There


is


also


a


sense


of


equitable exchange. One division


may make a disproportionate contribution or may


benefit less from the progress made, but such short term inequalities will balance out


over the long term.




Incidentally, the positive contribution of the SBU manager should be made visible


across the company. An SBU manager is unlikely to surrender key people if only the


other business (or the general manager of that business who may be a competitor for


promotion)


is


going


to


benefit


from


the


redeployment.


Cooperative


SBU


managers


should


be


celebrated


as


team


players.


Where


priorities


are


clear,


transfers


are


less


likely to be seen as idiosyncratic and politically motivated.




Transfers


for


the


sake


of


building


core


competence


must


be


recorded


and


appreciated


in


the


corporate


memory.


It


is


reasonable


to


expect


a


business


that


has


surrendered core skills on behalf of corporate opportunities in other areas to lose, for a


time,


some


of


its


competitiveness.


If


these


losses


in


performance


bring


immediate

-


-


-


-


-


-


-


-



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